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Aside from the basic African dialects, I would try to learn Chinese, be-
cause it looks as if Chinese will be the most powerful political language
of the future.'
INTRODUCTION
The foregoing statement of Malcolm X, made in the 1960s, ver-
balizes perceptions embraced forty years later. China is a growing
and prosperous nation that many predict will become the second
most powerful military and economic nation in the world, behind the
United States, within the early part of the new millennium.' China's
tremendous economic and military development generates the per-
ception that a United States-China conflict is either exaggerated or
inevitable.' China's developmental goals include a claim of right to
the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.4 The China/Taiwan5 claim
to the Spratly Islands is antagonistic towards the claims asserted by
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam who each claim the
Spratly Islands in whole or in part.6 The various claimants have
1. AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 416 (reprint edition 1992).
2. See RICHARD BERNSTEIN & Ross H. MUNRO, THE COMING CONFLICT WITH
CHINA 21 (1998) (stating that although China has behaved like a rogue nation in
the past, it will become the world's second most powerful military power with
comparable economic power).
3. See id. (proclaiming China to be a major military machine with visions of
becoming the most powerful nation in the world and a growing threat to American
interests). But see EZRA VOGEL, INTRODUCTION TO LIVING IN CHINA: US-CHINA
RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 30-31 (1997) (characterizing China as
an ally and advocating increased interaction and trade between the United States
and China).
4. See generally Teh-Kuang Chang, China's Claim of Sovereignty Over
Spratly and Paracel Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 23 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 399, 399 (1991).
5. See Some Questions and Answers on the China-Taiwan Dispute, available
in (visited Mar. 10, 2000) <http://www.nando.net/newsroom/nt/312exchiqua.html>
(detailing the current dispute between China and Taiwan and defining the contro-
versy over Taiwan).
6. See Lian A. Mito, The Timor Gap Treaty as a Model for Joint Development
in the Spratly Islands, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727, 749 (1998) (stating that each
nation bases its claim on both legal and historical grounds).
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found themselves in a stalemate with occasional military skirmishes.
China's tremendous military and economic growth enables China to
demand that any resolution of the dispute meet its base expectations.
Any direction China takes to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute will
impact Asia and the Western world, defining world politics in the
new millennium. This Article focuses on China's perception of the
Spratly Islands dispute and China's potential courses of conduct as it
relates to resolving the dispute.
Part I of this Article provides a description of the problems, ten-
sions, and rewards associated with the acquisition of the Spratly Is-
lands. Part II discusses the correlation between China's growth and
the United States' concerns regarding the Spratly Islands. Part III is
an overview of the conflicting claims asserted by China, Vietnam,
the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei to establish ownership of the
Spratly Islands. Part IV presents China's current and historical ap-
proaches to international law in the context of an examination of
various theories of international law which include sover-
eign/enforcement theory, treaties, natural law, and the realist school
of thought. This discussion provides a background in order to predict
China's future course of conduct in relation to the Spratly Islands. In
this Part, the Article explains that because China is a realist nation,
China's economic and military power will solidify or exacerbate ten-
sion between the claimants.
Part V of this Article provides projections for the future of the
Spratly Islands and indicates that the dispute is plagued with factors
such as the plight of the status quo, shortcomings in international
law, tense United States-China relations, and a dire shortage of rec-
ommendations to resolve the dispute. Part VI presents recommenda-
tions to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute. The conclusion suggests
that the ownership of the Spratly Islands should be characterized as
"relations" rather than a "thing" and therefore vests each claimant
with stakeholder rights to the oil and fish reserves in the Spratly Is-
lands based on their relationship with the Spratly Islands. The extent
of a particular claimant's relationship to the Spratly Islands would be
based on the number of claims it has asserted. The claims are tallied
and the total determines a claimant's right of percentage to the reve-
7. Id. at 749.
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nues. The conclusion also addresses possible criticisms of the point
system. Finally, this Article suggests a bid for a peaceful resolution
of the Spratly Islands dispute through increased dialogue in the re-
gion to develop viable solutions, increased United States-China rela-
tions, and an adoption of B.A. Hamzah's confidence building meas-
ures8 along with the point system.
I. THE SPRATLY PROBLEM
The territory commonly called the Spratly Islands is a disputed
area located in the South China Sea.9 The Spratly Islands consist of
hundreds of small islets, coral reefs, sandbars, and atolls covering
180,000 square kilometers'" and different countries refer to the is-
lands by different names. Vietnam named the islands "Truong Sa"
Islands," China named them "Nansha" Islands,"2 and the Philippines
calls them the "Kalayaan" Islands." The struggle among various
countries to name the islands is an attempt to establish and solidify a
perceptual transformation and paradigm for vested property interests
or ownership of the islands. There has been a continual political tug-
of-war between Brunei, China/Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Vietnam over control and ownership of the islands. 4 Each nation
has claimed rights to all or part of the Spratly Islands. The numerous
claims overlap and result in considerable tension in Southeast Asia.
The crux of the Spratly Islands dispute centers on the potential
8. See infra notes 213-22 and accompanying text (describing B.A. Hamzah's
proposed confidence measures).
9. See Chang, supra note 4, at 400 n.8 (explaining that the Spratly Islands are
named after the British Sea Captain Spratly).
10. But see Christopher Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute: What Role for
Normalizing Relations Between China and Taiwan, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 819, 824
(1998) (stating that the actual land mass of the islands only amounts to 3.1 square
miles).
11. See Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Island Dispute and the Law of the Sea, 25
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 61, 65 (1994).
12. Id. at 64.
13. Id. at 66.
14. See generally id. at 62 (concluding that various claims to the Spratly Is-
lands are based on sometimes incomplete and ancient interpretations of ownership
which has the potential to provoke armed conflict).
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wealth and strategic military value of the Islands. The Spratly Islands
are located in the South China Sea, 900 miles south of the Chinese
island of Hainan, 230 miles east of Vietnam, 120 miles west of the
Philippine island of Palawan, and 150 miles northwest of the Malay-
sian state of Sabah. 5 They connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans and
thereby establish a major sea-route and strategic military position
linking Asia, Africa, and Europe.'6 An estimated eighty percent of
Japan's and seventy percent of Taiwan's oil and raw material imports
pass through the South China Sea,'7 while twenty-five percent of the
world's oil production passes through the area en route from the
Middle East to Japan and the United States.'" Control of the Spratly
Islands could serve as a means to impact oil transports both in South-
east Asia and the remainder of the industrialized world because own-
ership and control of the Spratly Islands provides sovereign rights
over the adjacent waters and seabed.' 9 Many analysts consider the
South China Sea area, which encompasses the Spratly Islands, to
have vast riches of oil and natural gas.2° Chinese officials estimate
the oil reserves at one trillion U.S. dollars.2' Many analysts believe it
is one of the most lucrative fishing areas in the world with an annual
value estimated in the mid-1990s at three billion U.S. dollars.2'
In addition to the potential economical wealth, the Spratly Islands
have strategic value as well. During World War II, Japan used the
Spratly Islands as military outposts for both invasions and block-
15. Id. at 61.
16. Cordner, supra note 11, at 61.
17. See Paul Martin, Regional Efforts at Preventive Measures: Four Case
Studies on the Development of Conflict-Prevention Capabilities, 30 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 881, 928 (1998).
18. Nicholas Marsh, The Spratly Islands Dispute (visited Jan. 21, 2000)
<http://vww.ukdf.org.uk/rsl4.htm>.
19. See generally Donald E. Karl, Islands and the Delimnitation of the Conti-
nental Shelf: A Franzeworkfor Analysis, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1977) (discussing
the treatment of islands in delimitation of maritime boundaries between opposite
and adjacent states).
20. See Cordner, supra note 11, at 6 1.
21. See Marsh, supra note 18.
22. See BOB CATLEY & MAKMUR KELIAT, SPRATLYS: THE DISPUTE IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA 47 (1997) (stating that the annual catch amounts to between 2
and 2.5 million tons).
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ades.23 Near the close of the twentieth century a Japanese military
analyst theorized that whichever nation controlled the Spratly Islands
would gain regional hegemony in the new millennium.24 Among the
various nations that claim ownership of the Spratly Islands-Brunei,
China/Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, China's
claim presents the most intriguing issues that will define interna-
tional affairs in the new millennium. China is in the best position
among the claimants to become an uncontested power in Asia, filling
the vacuum created when the Soviet Union and the United States
withdrew from Southeast Asia.25 China's military strength has had a
fundamental impact on the dialogue and proposals initiated to re-
solve the Spratly Islands dispute. Any agreement concerning the
Spratly Islands that does not satisfy China's interests would fail at its
inception and possibly result in military conflict involving one or
more of the claimants and the United States.
II. CHINA'S GROWTH AND THE UNITED STATES'
CONCERNS
The different perceptions of China's intentions in Southeast Asia
arise, in part, from China's military and economic expansion in its
eastern coastline. China developed a Positive Defense Strategy in
1995, called Jixi Fang, which established a military security belt
around China spanning from China's northeast coast to its southeast26
coast. The range of the belt is enormous. It encompasses southern
China and includes the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South
23. See id. at 47 (asserting that Japan's occupation of the Spratly Islands during
World War II provided a strategic outpost relative to Western colonial powers and
an opportunity to advance in the Southeast Asian region).
24. See Mito, supra note 6, at 729 n.8 (quoting from a statement in the Filipino
Express, Mar. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 15673215).
25. See Michael Bennett, The People's Republic of China and the Use of Inter-
national Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 425, 427 (1997)
(concluding that China may pursue a resolution to its claim to the Spratly Islands
without military conflict in the absence of a United States and Soviet presence in
the region).
26. See James Lilley, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Future with
Hope (Symposium: Bridging the Taiwan Strait-Problems and Prospects Jbr
China's Reunification or Taiwan's Independence), 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 743, 744
(1998) (outlining the boundaries of China's security belt around its coastal areas).
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China Sea and extends north beyond Taiwan. China established the
belt to protect its most prosperous economic areas in the southeast
and eastern coastal regions, including Hong Kong, Macau, Shanghai,
and Guangdong.2 The belt continues further north to the Senkaku
Islands (the Chinese name, Diaoyus) and out towards the East China
Sea to the Korean peninsula.29 The belt manifests China's claim of
sovereignty over its coast, continental shelf, exclusive economic
zone, adjacent territories, and areas with historical contacts such as
the Spratly Islands. China's land mass enables it to claim ownership
of vast coastal areas and nearby seas. Such claims have repercussions
in Asia because numerous other nations in Asia also claim the same
seas and adjoining areas. In addition to the belt, the statement made
in 1995 by Qian Qichen, then Foreign Minister, and later the Vice
Premier of State Council, that it was time for the United States to
stop considering itself the savior of the East," exemplifies China's
intent and potential to emerge as a major power.
The coastal belt coupled with Minister Qichen's statement has in-
ternational implications because the United States engaged in nu-
merous military conflicts in Asia during the last century, ensuring
that a single nation could not emerge as a major power and a con-
trolling military, economic, or ideological force in Asia. Between
1899 to 1901 the United States conquered the Philippine Islands. The
United States did so in order to protect the United States' interests in
the area following the war with Spain, as well as to quash Filipino
efforts for independence. In 1900, the United States joined Great
Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria, Italy, and Japan to stop
the Boxer Rebellion in Beijing because this rebellion threatened
European interests in China. The United States fought against Japan
27. Id.
28. See generally CHINA, A COUNTRY STUDY 19 (Frederica M. Bunge & Rinn-
Sup Shin eds., 1981).
29. See Lilley, supra note 26, at 744.
30. Id.
31. See BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 2, at 20 (asserting that this statement
indicates that China's strategic thinking had changed). The authors claim that de-
spite rhetoric to the contrary, China has positioned itself to become the most pow-
erful nation in the world, and despite United States-China dialogue over the years
China has done nothing to remedy the three areas often at issue: human rights,
arms proliferation, and trade imbalance. Id. at 9.
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in World War II from 1941 to 1945. From 1950 to 1953 the United
States fought the North Koreans and Chinese to prevent Soviet rule
over Korea. During the period of 1964 to 1975, the United States
fought against North Vietnam to prevent the communist north from
controlling South Vietnam. In sum, from 1899 to 1975 the United
States engaged in battle after battle in Asia for control."
At the close of the twentieth century, China has the goal to mod-
ernize its nuclear capacity and make its military forces more accu-
rate, easier to launch, mobile, and less vulnerable. The United States
is faced with the realization that in the new millennium China will be
a world power, and the uncontested power in Asia. The United States
must prepare for evolving future relations with China. The belt,
along with China's military growth, are perceived challenges to
United States' interests in Asia because they have a potential impact
upon existing sea-lanes, oil reserves, the Senkaku Islands," the Ko-
rean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Spratly Islands. The Taiwan issue,
with the adjunct concern of the Spratly Islands, presents complex
concerns and the possibility of conflict between China and the
United States .
32. Historically, the United States has waged war against Asia on the premise
that Asia was a place that should be contained because Asian nations were incapa-
ble of understanding and controlling world politics. See generally HENRY
KISSINGER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 48 (1974); cf LouIs HENKIN ET AL.,
RIGHT V. MIGHT 50-51 (1989) (concluding that wars have been nonexistent among
the major powers or on the Western Hemisphere after the two world wars).
33. See Sara Galley, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1996
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 109, 112 (1996) (finding that as in the case of
the Spratly Islands, oil reserves are also behind the dispute between China and Ja-
pan over the Senkaku Islands); see also Yoshiro Matsui, International Law of Ter-
ritorial Acquisition and the Dispute Over the Senkaku (Diaoyus) Islands, 40
JAPAN. ANN. OF INT'L L. 3, 3 (1997) (stating that Japan's claim to the Senkaku Is-
lands has been disputed by China and Taiwan since 1971 when a survey found
possible petroleum resources on the continental shelf surrounding the islands).
34. See Julian Baum et al., Taiwan Upping the Ante, FAR E. ECON. REV., July
22, 1999 (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.feer.com/9907_22/pl8taiwan.html>
(recounting an incident in 1996 where China and the United States nearly engaged
in battle when China threatened Taiwan by firing missiles into the Taiwan Strait
and the United States responded by sending two aircraft carriers to the region).
Three years later, in July 1999, the United States expressed its position after Tai-




There has been an uneasy tension between Taipei and Beijing
since the 1949 civil war when Chiang Kai-Shek fled the mainland to
Taiwan. Both Taipei and Beijing claim the status as the representa-
tive government of China. This tension has had international ramifi-
cations. In an effort to dissipate Taipei's discomfort about a possible
invasion by the mainland and to nurture the burgeoning economic
development and democracy in Taipei," the United States entered
into the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act ("TRA") under President Car-
ter's administration.36 The TRA was President Carter's attempt to re-
assure Taipei that the international community acknowledged its
right to exist, independent of Beijing."7 Previously, under the Nixon
Administration, the United States recognized Beijing as the govern-
ing power pursuant to the 1972 Shanghai Communique.' The TRA
was also an effort by the United States to send a firm message to
Beijing, which the United States perceived as militarily inept in
1979. The TRA specified the United States' objectives concerning
cultural, commercial, and military relations with Taiwan."' It articu-
lated the United States' position, emphasizing that since Taiwan has
both economic and geopolitical significance for the United States,
the United States has an obligation to provide both military and eco-
35. See Howard Shapiro, CLE Conference The Tides of Trade: The Four Ti-
gers, 2 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 87, 87 (1990) (including Taiwan with its vast techno-
logical development, as one of the Four Tigers). The other Tigers are Hong Kong,
Singapore, and South Korea. Id. See generally Robb M. LaKritz, Taming a 5,000
Year-Old Dragon: Toward a Theoty of Legal Development In Post-Mao China, 11
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 237, 237 (1997) (arguing that China will become the new
Tiger, but that the freedoms associated with market participants will remain non-
existent in China).
36. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979), 22
U.S.C.A. see. 3301.
37. See Glenn R. Butterton, Signals, Threats, and Deterrence: Alive and Well
in the Taiwan Strait, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 51, 60-62 (1997) (stating that although
the Taiwan Relations Act established diplomatic relations with the People's Re-
public of China, it also provided for a commitment to Taiwan's defense).
38. See BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 2, at 22 (specifying the United
States' position on the Taiwan issue); see also 66 DEP'T ST. BULL. 435 (Mar. 20,
1972); 11 I.L.M. 443 (1972). The Shanghai Communique, signed on February 27,
1972, was an agreement between China and the United States which established
that there is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part.
39. See Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979), 22
U.S.C.A. 3301.
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nomic security against Mainland invasion, intervention, and coer-
cion.40 Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, a waterway approximately 100
miles wide that separates the Mainland from Taiwan, are part of the
northern end of the belt established by Beijing.' It extends from
north of Taiwan to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. If both
Taiwan and the Spratly Islands come under the Mainland sphere of
influence then China will have increased control over the lucrative
resources and shipping lanes in the South China Sea.42 Flow will
China gain control over the Spratly Islands? Will China use its mili-
tary and/or economic power? While China defines itself in the
twenty-first century, it is confronted with multifarious boundary dis-
putes with India, Russia, Tajikistan, North Korea, and Vietnam (in
the Gulf of Tonkin), and disputes concerning ownership of the
Paracel Islands (involving Vietnam), the Senkaku Islands (involving
Japan), and the Spratly Islands (involving Malaysia, the Philippines,
Vietnam, and Brunei). The resolution of any of these disputes could
have international implications on trade and the balance of power
both in Asia and the Western World. The remainder of this Article
specifically examine the Spratly Islands dispute.
III. CONFLICTING VIEWS
The Spratly Islands are a highly prized area in the South China Sea
claimed by China/Taiwan, Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Vietnam. Each claimant values the potential wealth associated with
oil reserves in the region. As a result of the inability of these coun-
tries to agree on a solution to the Spratly Islands issue, there is cur-
rently a stalemate. Each country believes that their claim to the
Spratly Islands has a basis in history, emotions, economics, and poli-
tics.
40. See Nicholas Rastow, Taiwan: Playing for Time, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV.
707, 709 (1998) (stating that diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
China is dependent on the expectation of a peaceful determination of the future of
Taiwan).
41. See Lilley, supra note 26, at 744.
42. Control of shipping lanes has been at the root of international conflicts in
places such as the Panama Canal, South Africa and the Suez Canal.
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A. CHINA
China's scholars contend that Chinese history, as it relates to the
Spratly Islands, dates back thousands of years. The Chinese dynas-
ties of the Xia (twenty-first to sixteenth centuries B.C.), the Shang
(sixteenth to eleventh centuries B.C.), the Zhou (eleventh century to
221 B.C. covering the Spring and Autumn Period 770 to 476 B.C.
and the Warring States Period 403 to 221 B.C.), the Qin (221 to 206
B.C.), the Han (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.), the Tang (618 to 907), the
Song (960 to 1279), the Yuan (1279 to 1368) the Ming (1368 to
1644) and, the Qing (1644 to 1911/12) each have historical contacts
with the Spratly Islands. Scholars date China's knowledge and con-
trol of the Spratly Islands to a time prior to the Han Dynasty." There
are numerous Chinese publications that refer to the South China Sea
Islands such as historical books, records, poems, and classic Chinese
text.45 For example, a seventy-one volume collection called, Yi Zhou
Shu (Scattered Books of the Zhou Dynasty), which was written dur-
ing the Qin Dynasty (over 200 B.C.) refers to the Xia Dynasty rulers
who ordered the "barbarians" from the South China Sea area to pro-
vide them with pearl-carrying shellfish and turtles. "6 There is evi-
dence that this practice of providing a tribute to the rulers continued
through the Shang Dynasty.
The classical poetry collection Shi Jing,' and other Chinese clas-
sics written in the Spring and Autumn Period such as Zuo Zhuan
(Zuo's Commentaries)49 and Guo Yu (Statement of the States)" refer
to the South China Sea islands. Chinese scholars contend that the an-
cient writings establish that China was aware of, made expeditions
43. See generally Jianring Shen, International Law Rules and Historical Evi-
dences Supporting China's Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 15, 20 (1997).
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id. at 15-36.
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id. at 16.
48. See Shen, supra note 43, at 16.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 17 (explaining that statements were made by nobles in reference
to the South China Sea, demonstrating that rulers were aware of the islands).
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to, and controlled the Spratly Islands as early as the Spring and
Autumn Period and the Warring States Period of China.5 After that
period, between the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.) and the
Song Dynasty (960 A.D. to 1279 A.D.) extensive Chinese scholar-
ship demonstrates that Chinese sailors sailed to, and exercised juris-
diction over, the Spratly Islands.52 Furthermore, the Song dynasty
(960 to 1279 A.D.) produced numerous chronicles, records, and
books which refer to the South China Sea Islands." The Yuan Dy-
nasty's (1279 to 1360 A.D.) exercise of jurisdiction over the South
China Sea Islands included: sending surveyors, recording naval in-
spections, and patrolling the area.14 The Ming Dynasty (1367 to 1644)
and the Qing Dynasty (1644 to 1911) maintained records that con-
tained geographical descriptions of the Spratly Islands." Conse-
quently, in 1911, during the emergence of the Republic of China un-
der Chiang Kai-Shek, China exercised jurisdiction over the Spratly
Islands through business endeavors, surveys, military personnel, ex-
ploitation of natural resources, published maps, and the construction
of structures.16 In effect, China contends that it was the first country
to discover and exercise dominion and control over the Spratly Is-
lands.57
51. Id. at 15-36.
52. Id. at 17-21 (determining that Chinese crews continuously passed through
and around the South China Sea, renamed the sea, and described its features). They
even named the islands. Id.
53. See Shen, supra note 43, at 21-26 (concluding that although there may be
discrepancies in the translation of these writings, the islands were clearly within
the Song empire's boundaries).
54. See id. at 27-29 (finding that maps produced in the Yuan dynasty included
the islands).
55. See id. at 29-36 (referring to continued activities in and around the islands
that demonstrated Chinese sovereignty over the islands).
56. See id. at 37 (stating that at that time, the development of the South China
Sea islands was a priority for the Chinese government).
57. See CHOON-HO PARK, EAST ASIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 214 (1983)
(quoting Shi Ti-Tsu, South China Sea Islands, Chinese Territory Since Ancient
Times, PEKING REv., Dec. 12, 1975, at 10- 11). Shi Ti-Tsu stated that:
[m]ore than 2,000 years ago, Chinese individuals were already sailing on the
turbulent waves of the South China Sea, as recorded in ancient Chinese lit-
erature. By the time of the Western and Eastern Han dynasties (206 B.C. to
220 A.D.), the South China Sea had become an important navigation route for
[15:527
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China's claim of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands has not gone
unchallenged. From 1933 to 1939, the Spratly Islands were part of
French Indochina." During World War II, Japan occupied China"
and took possession of the Spratly Islands, among other islands and
territories. Japan used the Islands as naval bases for both staging in-
vasions and blockadesY After the war the islands were returned to
China under both the 1943 Cairo Conference" and the 1945 Potsdam
Proclamation.2 In 1946, China held a take-over ceremony on the
Spratly Islands, and at the 1952 San Francisco Allied Peace Confer-
ence Japan stated that it had renounced all rights to Taiwan, the
Spratly Islands, and other islands that it occupied during the war. In
1955, the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO") held
the Conference on Pacific Region Aviation in Manila and assigned
Taiwan the task to improve meteorological observations throughout
China. As navigation steadily developed, long years of sailing the seas en-
abled the Chinese people to become the first discoverers and the masters of
the South China Sea Islands. These valuable islands, surveyed, worked and
administered without a break became an inalienable part of our beautiful
motherland.
Id.
58. See id. at 185-86, 215 (discussing France's economically and strategically
based reassertion of its protectorate, Vietnam's claims to the Spratly Islands almost
fifty years after agreeing to cede control of them to China).
59. See generally IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING (1997) (detailing the de-
feat, humiliation, and genocide suffered by one Chinese city and its population at
the hands of Japanese invaders in 1937-38).
60. See PARK, supra note 57, at 215 (stating that Japan used the Spratly Islands
as submarine bases during World War I).
61. See Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek,
and Prime Minister Churchill in North Africa, released to the press Dec. 1, 1943,
DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 4, 1943, at 393, 3 Bevans 858 [hereinafter Cairo Declara-
tion] (resolving, among other things that "all the territories that Japan has stolen
from the Chinese ... shall be restored to the Republic of China [and that) Japan
will ... be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and
greed.").
62. See Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1945,
para. 8, DEP'T ST. BULL., July 29, 1945, at 137, 3 Bevans 1204, 1205 [hereinafter
Potsdam Proclamation] (asserting that, as one condition of its surrender, "[t]he
terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall
be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and minor is-
lands as [the Allied signatories] determine.").
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the Spratly Islands.63 As early as the 1950s mapmakers in several na-
tions marked the Spratly Islands as Chinese territory on their world
maps. 4 Notwithstanding the aforementioned instances of recognition
of Chinese sovereignty claims to the Spratly Islands by certain car-
tographers, Vietnam and the Philippines have demonstrated their
unwillingness to accede to any such claims through a series of mili-
tary confrontations with China.
B. VIETNAM
Vietnam, similar to China, also claims ownership of the entire
Spratly Islands. 65 The Spratly Islands are situated 800 kilometers east
of Ho Chi Minh City.66 Vietnam, a country in need of capital,6 7 has an
intense desire to acquire the potential wealth of oil and gas located in
the Spratly Islands.68 Vietnam's claim is based on two theories. First,
63. See Bennett, supra note 25, at 448 & n.135 (citing the People's Republic of
China's ("PRC") use of this request by the ICAO as one specific instance of inter-
national recognition of its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands).
64. See THE PENGUIN ATLAS OF THE WORLD 41 (J.S. Keates ed. (U.K.), 1956);
THE LAROUSSE ATLAS OF THE WORLD (France, 1956); THE STANDARD WORLD
ATLAS (Japan, 1952), cited in The Question of the South China Sea (visited Aug.
23, 1999) <http://www.china-embassy.org/Cgi-Bin/press.pl?SouthChinaSea>.
65. See Joyner, supra note 10, at 821 nn.3-4 (discussing violent clashes be-
tween China and Vietnam in 1987 and 1988 that resulted in significant loss of
Vietnamese lives and vessels; and noting that, while these conflicts demonstrate
China's naval superiority, the Vietnamese continued to build up their naval pres-
ence in the islands). The 1988 clash between the two states has been described as
their "most serious conflict" since China's 1979 invasion of Vietnam in response
to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and a dispute concerning the Gulf of Tonkin.
See Daniel Sutherland, China Assails Vietnam Over Island Group: Hanoi Said to
Double Forces Near Spratlys, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1988, at A32 (reporting on the
issuance of a warning by China to Vietnam, demanding its withdrawal from "Chi-
nese islands and atolls").
66. See generally Joyner, supra note 10, at 824 (setting forth the geographical
coordinates of the archipelago).
67. See generally Peter G. Furniss, Recent Development, The United States-
Vietnam Trade Relationship: Politics and Law in the Process of Normalization, 35
HARV. INT'L L.J. 238, 242 (1994). (asserting that Vietnam's desire to normalize
trade relationships and gain access to blocked International Monetary Fund
("IMF") funds springs from its "desperate" need for capital to rebuild its destroyed
infrastructure).
68. See Joyner, supra note 10, at 833-34 nn.40-44 (discussing the results if un-
dersea seismic surveys in the Spratly Islands, conducted in the 1960s and the de-
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Vietnam claims that it has exercised historical dominion and control
over the Spratly Islands, dating back to 1650 to 1653." Notwith-
standing the fact that the government of North Vietnam had con-
curred with Chinese claims of sovereignty over the Islands in the
1950s, the reunited Vietnam reasserted its claim to the entire archi-
pelago. 0 Vietnam argues that its right to the Spratly Islands vested at
the San Francisco Allied-Japanese Peace Conference in 1951 when
Japan relinquished all right to the islands" and Vietnam asserted its
claim. Second, Vietnam claims a right to the Spratly Islands be-
cause the Islands are within its continental shelf.
velopment, by China, of its offshore petroleum industry). But see id. at 835 n.45
(noting that some experts have concluded based on more recent geological findings
that the initial estimates of oil potential were exaggerated).
69. See Cordner, supra note 11, at 65 (stating that although the Vietnamese
government has recently claimed ownership of the Spratly Islands extending back
to the eighteenth century, it has failed to offer any evidence to substantiate the
claim). The Vietnamese government has stated that:
[f]rom time immemorial, these islands have been frequented by Vietnamese
fisherman who went there for tortoises, sea slugs, and other marine creatures.
In recent times, the Paracels have attracted exploiters of phosphates, rich beds
of which are produced by the interaction of the guano of seabirds with the
tropical rains and coral limestone. Like the Paracels, the Spratlys are closest
to Vietnam geographically and have been part of her territory early in history.
In 1834, under the reign of Emperor Minh Mang, the Spratly Islands appeared
in the first Vietnamese map as an integral part of the national territory.
See Park, supra note 57, at 65 (quoting Fact Sheet No. 274, issued by the Embassy
of South Vietnam on Jan. 28, 1974).
70. See Cordner, supra note 11, at 65-66 (arguing that because the current gov-
ernment of Vietnam is the successor state to the government of North Vietnam, the
latter's concession to Chinese claims over the Spratly Islands is binding under in-
ternational law principles).
71. See Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, ch. 1I, art. 2(f), 3 U.S.T.
3169, 3172, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, 50 ("Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the
Spratly Islands...").
72. See Cordner, supra note 11, at 65 (observing that Vietnam's claim of sov-
ereignty over the Islands went unchallenged at the San Francisco Peace Confer-
ence because the PRC was not present). The PRC immediately and forcefully re-
butted Vietnam's claim. See id. at 64 (quoting the PRC's foreign minister as
stating that its sovereignty over the islands will not be affected by the language of
the peace treaty with Japan).
2000]
AM. U. INT' L. REv.
C. THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippines' claim to the Spratly Islands is based on economic
need, proximity, and abandonment of rights by all other nations that
led to Philippine discovery of the Islands in 1947." Interestingly,
following the war with Spain in 1898, the United States and Spain
signed a treaty that among other things defined the "Philippine Is-
lands" and transferred them to the United States. The treaty, how-
ever, neglected to include the Spratly Islands in this land transfer.
14
The Philippines, like Vietnam, has had clashes with China over the
Spratly Islands. In 1998, Beijing expanded some permanent struc-
tures it had built earlier on Mischief Reef.7 The Philippines claimed
Mischief Reef within its exclusive economic zone and asserted that
the Spratly Islands are over one thousand miles away from China's
coast, 76 and that China's structure was for military use rather than
shelter for fisherman. As a result, there have been several conflicts
between China and the Philippines in the later part of the twentieth
century.
D. MALAYSIA AND BRUNEI
Both Malaysia and Brunei claim interests in the Spratly Islands
based on geographic proximity within their respective continental77
shelves. Under the Law of the Sea Treaty, 7 state territory includes
73. See Cordner, supra note 11, at 66 (describing the "discovery" of most of
the islands, now known as the Spratly Islands, by a Filipino private citizen). The
Filipino "discoverer" proclaimed the islands a new state in 1956 and transferred
ownership to the Philippines in 1974. Id.
74. See Treaty of Peace, Dec. 109, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. III, 30 Stat. 1754,
1755-56 (setting forth the geographical coordinates defining the territory trans-
ferred).
75. See generally Joyner, supra note 10, at 821 n.5 (describing the PRC's
original invasion of Mischief Reef in 1995).
76. The Spratly Islands are 900 km southwest of Manila, and 1,300 km south
of Hong Kong.
77. See Cordner, supra note 11, at 67-68 (setting forth Malaysia and Brunei's
respective continental shelf based claims of sovereignty over certain southern
Spratly islands).
78. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-39, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force
Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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both a continental shelf,79 which allows for the exploitation of natural
resources, and an exclusive economic zone which can extend limited
sovereignty to a distance of approximately 200 nautical miles from
the coastline.80 Malaysia also asserts that it has discovered and cur-
rently occupies several islands.
The competing claims asserted by China, Vietnam, the Philip-
pines, Malaysia and Brunei generate the potential for military con-
flict due to the economic and military strategic value of the Spratly
Islands. Among all the claimants, China has the greatest military
ability to seize the Spratly Islands. The question remains, however,
as to how China will resolve this disputed issue.
IV. CHINA'S PAST APPROACHES TOWARDS
INTERNATIONAL LAW
There are various theories of international law. An explanation of
the theories is vital towards an understanding of how China perceives
international law and what theory it will embrace to resolve the
Spratly Island dispute.
A. SOVEREIGN ENFORCEMENT THEORY
Sovereign/Enforcement theorists, such as the early nineteenth
century English scholar John Austin, advocated that international law
is nonexistent, or at best merely international morality. M In Austin's
view, international law is an inaccurate term because "law" necessi-
tates a sovereign and enforcement paradigm. Law, from Austin's
79. See id. pt. VI, art. 77, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-39, at 126, 21 I.L.M. at
1285 (setting forth that a state has the exclusive sovereign right to explore its con-
tinental shelf and exploit its natural resources). Part VI of the UNCLOS defines the
continental shelf and sets forth the rights and duties of the coastal state and all
other states within that area. See id. pt. VI, arts. 76-85, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-
39, at 125-28, 21 I.L.M. at 1285-86.
80. See id. pt. V, arts. 55-75, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-39, at 115-25, 21 I.L.M.
at 1280-84 (defining the limits of the EEZ and setting forth the rights and duties of
the coastal state and other states within the EEZ). All other states may use the EEZ
with the same freedoms accorded to them with respect to the "high seas" under the
UNCLOS. See id. pt. V, art, 58, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-39, at 116, 21 I.L.M. at
1280.
81. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED ETC.
(Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., Noonday Press 1954).
2000]
AM. U. INT' L. REV.
positivist perspective, is a series of mandates established by an over-
seer that enforces them through deprivations and disabilities. For ex-
ample, a country enacts a statute, drafts a constitution, establishes
common law, or follows religious dictates to determine what consti-
tutes an offense and then penalizes violators. In Austin's view the
international arena lacks both the sovereign nature to enact the law
and the ability to sanction countries that violate the law."' This lack
of enforcement is reflected in the principle, par in parem non habet
imperiun, a cogitation indicating that one state is not invested with
legal or official authority to exercise jurisdiction over another state
because of their equal legal status.
A modem positivist, philosopher, and law professor H.L.A. Hart,
endorsed Austin's position with an addendum followed by jurispru-
dential countenance. Hart concedes, unlike Austin, that international
law exists. He contends, however, that it "consists of only primary
rules of obligation,"83 which are devoid of enforcement mechanisms
sufficient for recognition as a Copernican system of law. Hart, in ef-
fect, perceives international law as primitive, unfilled, and frustrated
in realizing an aim. International law, in his view, is not law; rather it
is a set of unenforceable moral directives."
China, prior to the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and particularly
during the Mao Zedong era, embraced the Austin/Hart position that
international law was simply a form of international morality."" China
82. But see Anthony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereigny and Colo-
nialism in the Nineteenth Century International Law 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 13-17
(1999) (arguing that society, and not sovereignty, is the foundation of international
law); Roger Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1130, 1332-34 (1961) (suggesting that international law should not be discounted
on the theory that a state will not submit to an adverse decision by an international
tribunal because the United States often accepts adverse decisions by domestic tri-
bunals notwithstanding the absence of a superior sovereign compelling it to com-
ply).
83. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961) (likening international law
to a "simple form of social structure" given the absence of an international legis-
lature, courts of mandatory jurisdiction, and centralized enforcement).
84. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 42 (1977) (noting
Hart's argument that it is inadequate for a rule to be characterized as solely morally
binding).
85. See A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 4 (1962)
for a discussion of Chinese international law in ancient China.
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viewed the morality as a putative euphemism for western imperial-
ism. The Chinese leadership perceived international law as a mecha-
nism or tactic for "civilized states" to control and oppress "uncivi-
lized states." 6 China's position concerning the legitimacy of
international law is amply depicted by China's meager amount of
scholarship on international law from 1965 to 1979. " Discussions of
international law were jettisoned in the interests of communism."
China refused to embrace new ideas and focused on the task of what
86. See JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-63 (1974) (reproducing a 1958 essay by a Chinese writer
who argued against the existence of general international law; and, while acknowl-
edging the Charter of the United Nations can be invoked to resist aggressive acts
by powerful states, he asserted that there was potential danger in accepting all
United Nations actions in the sense that the body was subject to manipulation by
powerful capitalist states); Gillian Triggs, Con/ifcius and Consensus: International
Law in the Asian Pacific, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 650, 652-53 (1997) (discussing the
impact that Asian Pacific states have had on international law through an analysis
of their distinctive features). The term "civilized" is taken from article 38 of the
States of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the International
Court of Justice shall settle disputes through the application of, inter alia, "the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." See Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (visited Feb. 24, 2000) <http:/uwww.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
ibas... ments/ibasictextlibasiestatute.htm> (emphasis added). The Charter of the
United Nations was signed by fifty nations in 1945 that shared similar cultural,
historical, and religious backgrounds. Since that time, eighty-nine countries have
decolonized and most have belief systems at variance with western values. See
Gillian Triggs, Confucius and Consensus: International Law in the .sian Pacific,
21 MELB. U. L. REv. 650, 652 (1997).
87. See MuRRAY SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO
CHINA 43 (1999) (suggesting that China's legal order had been destroyed through,
among other things, legal nihilism anti-intellectualism); Hungdah Chiu, Chinese
Views on the Sources of International Law, 28 HARV. INr'L L.J. 289, 289 (1987)
(stating that during the Cultural Revolution, the government of the PRC prohibited
the study of law, international and domestic). China was at a stage which the
United States currently wants to explore, namely less use of lawyers and more reli-
ance upon mediation to settle disputes. See generally Qizhi Luo, .Autonomn); Quali-
fication and Professionalism of the PRC Bar, 12 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 8-9 (1998)
(commenting on the exclusion of lawyers from the political and social arenas in
China during this period and the reliance upon mediation).
88. Centuries of leadership from the Forbidden City followed by communist
rule has placed China in a position where it has placed little emphasis on the de-
velopment of both a domestic and international legal system. See Susan Finder,
The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic ol'China. 7 J. CHINESE L.
145, 146-48 (1993); STANLEY B. LUBMAN, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS 1-3 (1996).
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has been termed "saving China."89 During this period, China suffered
from flashbacks of its history of defeats and oppressions beginning in
the early nineteenth century. China suffered a defeat in the Opium
War against Great Britain from 1839 to 1842.9 In 1856, Great Brit-
ain again defeated China. 9' In 1885, France defeated China for con-
trol of Vietnam,92 and in 1894 Japan took Taiwan from China.' The
military losses were compounded by the imposition of international
treaties upon China by the Western powers. Some commentators
have asserted that these "unequal treaties" imposed on China be-
tween 1842 and 1911 deprived China of the attributes of sovereignty
and created a sense of mistrust in the Chinese psyche concerning in-
ternational relations.94
Despite the trauma suffered in international relations during the
nineteenth century, the Chinese civilization, which has endured
4,000 years, constitutes the longest continuous civilization. In re-
sponse to a question posed by an American writer concerning the
impact of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution in China on the Chi-
nese people, a Chinese citizen remarked that the fifty years of com-
munist rule in China is but a speck of time in China's history and
when placed in context, "[t]he Cultural Revolution was hardly any-
thing."95 His observation is amply supported by post-Mao social re-
89. See JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION: 1800-1985,
287-88 (1986) (arguing that the intellectuals of China traditionally oriented toward
issues of state, continued this tradition during the Maoist era, fueled by a strong
spirit of nationalism).
90. See Wendy Abraham, Imperial China- Origins to 1911, located in CHINA,
A NATION IN TRANSITION 3, 26 (Debra E. Soled ed., 1995) (noting that the Opium
War defeat marked the beginning of a series of humiliating defeats to foreign pow-
ers that would span 100 years).
91. See id. at 31.
92. See id. (discussing in brief the conflict between France and China over the
control of Vietnam).
93. See id. at 32 (noting that the China's loss of Taiwan resulted from Japan's
victory over China in Korea).
94. See Bennett, supra note 25, at 442-43 (1992) (attributing the Chinese mis-
trust of international law, in part, to unequal treaties).
95. PAUL THEROUX, RIDING THE IRON ROOSTER: BY TRAIN THROUGH CHINA
81 (1988). Another Chinese citizen stated that "these intervals of unrest, sixty to a
hundred years in length between dynasties, through the forty-six centuries of [Chi-
nese] history" are not "wars," they are merely "period[s]."Id. (quoting from the
[15:527546
SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE
forms which have fostered a perspective in China that both national"
and international law97 markedly differently from the Mao era, and
have nurtured a preponderating and indefatigable China which has
begun to utilize international rules and norms.
Economically China began to assimilate into the world economy
in the later part of the twentieth century. China has the world's third-
largest economy, and enormous economic growth potential. " Its eco-
nomic growth has impacted its economic policies.' China has begun
cooperation between United States and Chinese lawyers,'"' has en-
couraged foreign investments and joint ventures,'"' hosts all the ma-
jor American accounting firms, and hundreds of thousands of its citi-
writings of another Western author).
96. See Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theor qf Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 229, 293 (1999) (noting the adoption by China of domestic contract laws
patterned on contract laws in Western states).
97. See Chiu, supra note 87, at 290 & n.6 (noting that the period between 1979
and 1984 is marked with over 700 articles on the subject of international law; and
providing a citation to an index that lists periodical articles).
98. See Omar Saleem, Be Fruitful, and Afultiply; and Replenish the Earth, and
Subdue it: Third World Population Growth and Global Warming, 8 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 29 (1995) (attributing China's economic growth potential to the
size of its population). But cf Mark Landler, Choking on China 's Air, But Loath to
Cry Foul, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at A3 (reporting on the potential downside
of heavy economic growth).
99. President Clinton perceived economic growth as a means for China to re-
solve its human rights problems and encourage democracy. Clinton advocated the
Most Favored Nation ("MFN") trade status with China as a means to end human
rights abuses. Perhaps the future will demonstrate that along with economic growth
that the internet will opens doors and foster democracy in China.
100. See James Podgers, Forging a Far East Alliance: Initiatives Ain to Foster
Stronger Legal Structures in China, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at 89 (reporting on ini-
tiatives of the American Bar Associations and others aimed at coordinating with
Chinese lawyers in order to develop China's legal system); Robert A. Stein. Two
Billion Reasons to Cooperate, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 86 (arguing that the pro-
grams underway by the Asian Law Initiatives Council, among others, will result in
a reduction of human rights abuses in China).
101. See BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 2, at 13, 105-07 (attributing China's
welcoming of foreign investments to Deng Xiaoping's comparatively liberal poli-
cies, providing anecdotal evidence of investments and joint ventures by major
American corporations in China, and noting the Chinese government's strategy in
1994 of enlisting American corporations to dissuade the Clinton administration
from canceling China's most favored nation trading status).
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zens are employed by foreign companies.' 2 China has embraced
American technology wholeheartedly. In the early 1990s, AT&T
sales in China exceeded 81 million U.S. dollars.' 3 Both Boeing and
General Electric have a significant presence in China."TM In 1998, Mi-
crosoft established a $80 million U.S. dollar research laboratory in
Beijing, China. One of the laboratory's first projects was the Venus
operating system that allows China's electronic industry to assemble
a Web browser, a low-end personal computer, and a video compact
disc player into a box, which sits atop a television. This device al-
lows the millions of Chinese who cannot afford a personal computer
to use the Internet.' °' Bill Gates, CEO of Microsoft stated, "Our goal
[in China] is a very aggressive goal, and that is to introduce millions
and millions of people to computers and to the Internet."' ' Motorola,
another high technology corporation, invested 1.5 billion U.S. dollars
in China, which in 1997 to 1998, established Motorola as the largest
American corporate investor in China.1
0 7
102. See Saleem, supra note 98, at 29 (noting that many people are employed by
foreign companies in Beijing).
103. See id. (noting that sales for AT&T were high and in conjunction with Chi-
nese interests).
104. Id.
105. See James Kynge, Microsoft Carves Major Inroad for Internet in Commu-
nist China, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1999, at 7 (reporting Microsoft's deal to install
the Internet in homes in China through the affordable Venus system). Bill Gates
made this announcement at a news conference in Shenshen, China in early 1999.
His goal was to bring affordable Internet service to the homes in China. The Venus
system was projected to cost less than two-hundred dollars, compared to the sig-
nificantly greater costs of a personal computer. Gates based his decision to design
the Venus system on China's growing consumer appliance market, the popularity
of video compact disc in China, and a Chinese parents' willingness to spend
money on their child in a culture where families are only permitted to have one
child. See China Now Home to 53 Million 'Little Emperors' (last modified June
15, 1999) <http://www.insidechina.com/features.php3?id=73492> (discussing how
the one child policy in China has caused Chinese parents to primp and pamper
their sole offspring).
106. See Microsoft: Cheap Net for China, 1999 Reuters Limited, 7:30 a.m., 10
Mar. 99, PST.
107. See Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd., Motorola in China 1999 (visited
Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.motorola.com.cn/english/facts98/> (noting that, as the
largest American investor in China, Motorola was involved in six equity joint
ventures, over twenty branches, and many other investments).
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The foreign investments in China are rapidly growing."' It is esti-
mated that as early as 1994 there were over 200 American investors
in Shanghai alone.'O Corporations with economic interests in China
include Ford Motor Company, Time Warner, IBM. Kentucky Fried
Chicken, and Boeing." Foreign investment throughout China is ex-
pected to increase due to China's huge population and its increasing
need for airplanes, machinery, transportation equipment, fabricated
metal products, dairy products, chicken, and meat."' Among the
American corporations that have yet to invest in China, approxi-
mately sixty-one percent plan to invest in the new millennium due to
domestic market expansion, good economic outlook, improved infra-
structure, and enormous export opportunities."2 In conjunction with
increased foreign investment, China joined the World Bank, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund ("IMF"), "' enjoyed Most Favored Nation
MFN") status, 4 and engaged in international politics for over a
108. But see Leslie Chang & Ian Johnson, Foreign Investment in China Falls as
Beiing Meddles With Market, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1999, at A9 (reporting that
the primary obstacle to foreign investments in China is China's policy of managing
its markets through bans on new investments to curtail falling prices and oversup-
ply).
109. See Saleem, supra note 98, at 29 (noting the large number of Amencan in-
vestors in Shanghai).
110. See BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 2, at 106-07 (noting the emerging
trend of business development in China by many American corporations).
111. See John W. Head, International Business and Kansas Lai'ers, 65 J. KAN.
B.A. 26, 31 (1996) (anticipating that China's increased needs in these areas will
make it an enormous potential market for American businesses).
112. See Malcolm S. McNeill, China"s Legal System in Transition: .4 Report of
the ABA Delegation to China, A.B.A. Sec. of Int'l L. & Prac., Oct. 10-14, 1994, at
3. But see James Bates & Maggie Farley, Hollywood, China in a Chilly Embrace:
Stormy Ties Between the Western Industry and Eastern Nation are Fraught with
Tangled Rules and Rampant Piracy, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1999, at Al (noting that
Hollywood is one American industry which has been unable to actualize a profit in
China). The failure of American movies and television to profit in China is due to
China's rule and regulations, different cultural standards, politics, race, and nation-
alism. Id.
113. See Bennett, supra note 25, at 444 (asserting that China's induction into the
World Bank and the IMF are testimony to the nation's immersion into the world's
economic system).
114. See Taunya L. McLarty, MFN Relations with Conmunist Countries: Is the
Two-Decade Old System Working, Or Should It Be Revised Or Repealed?, 33 U.
RICH. L. REv. 153, 191 (1999) (noting that China signed a bilateral trade agree-
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decade with particular intensity. Moreover, it appears that China will
soon become a member of the World Trade Organization."' At the
close of the twentieth century, China had the third largest economy
in the world, estimated at 1.66 trillion U.S. dollars,' 6 after the United
States and Japan. In the new millennium China is the only country
likely to surpass the United States as the world's largest economy
and become a major actor in international politics."17 Besides the
adoption of international economic norms, China has politically pro-
gressed from the Austin/Hart position that international law or rela-
tions is merely international morality. Post-Mao China has loomed as
an active world leader in international relations within international
organizations. At the dawn of the new millennium, China's percep-
tion of international law and international relations shifted to a utili-
tarian approach structured to accomplish national goals.
As a permanent member of the United Nations ("UN") Security
Council, China seeks to influence international relations and world
political decisions in its own interest. For example, China used its
position on the UN Security Council to protect its position concern-
ing Taiwan. In 1997, China vetoed the engagement of military ob-
ment with the United States in 1980, providing mutual MFN benefits between the
nations). Since that time, China has become one of the United States' largest trad-
ing partners. Id. at 191.
115. See Alan S. Alexandroff, Concluding China's Accession to the WTO: The
U.S. Congress and Permanent Most Favored Nation Status for China, 3 U.C.L.A.
J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 23, 30-42 (1998) (noting the various political challenges
that the United States Congress faced concerning China's entry into the World
Trade Organization). This issue was also a primary issue when China's Prime
Minister Zhu Rongji made a historical visit to the United States in April 1999. See
Paul Blustein, Clinton Scrambles to Appease Diverse Critics on China, WASH.
POST, Apr. 15, 1999, at Al (noting the intense negotiations between Chinese and
United States leaders regarding China's status in the WTO); see also The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President and Premier Zhu
of the People's Republic of China (last modified Apr. 8, 1999) <http://www.state.
gov/www/regions/eap/990408b_clintonzhuchina.html> (providing a detailed
dialogue between the United States and China regarding trade relations).
116. See IMMANUEL C.Y. Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 976 (1995) (noting
that the IMF placed China's economy as the third largest, based on its purchasing
power).
117. See id. at 978 (linking the growth of the economy to China's likely in-
creased investment in its military).
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servers in Guatemala in protest of Guatemala's ties with Taiwan."'
China reversed its decision only after Guatemala pledged not to sup-
port UN membership for Taiwan." 9 Similarly, China threatened to
veto the UN mission in Haiti due to Haiti's ties with Taiwan."" China
also threatened to use its Security Council veto power to keep the
proposal to maintain UN peacekeeping troops in Macedonia,
attempting to force Macedonia to sever its relations with Taiwan.2'
China's actual or threatened veto in the Security Council concerning
Guatemala, Haiti, and Macedonia stems from China's position that
nations must sever relations with Taiwan and recognize the People's
Republic of China as the sole government of China.'"
Purported UN Security Council resolutions to indict members of
the Cambodia's Khmer Rouge for war crimes-similar to Rwanda/
118. See China UN Veto Latest Skirmish in Diplomatic War with Taiwan.
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Feb. 26, 1999 (noting how China used its veto power in ob-
jection of Guatemala's diplomatic relations with Taiwan).
119. See id. (highlighting the negotiations between China and Guatemala, which
resulted in China lifting its veto during a second vote).
120. See id. (noting China's hesitation to permit UN troops in Haiti, due to
Haiti's ties with Taiwan).
121. See id. (reporting China's veto of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mace-
donia ignored warnings of further bloodshed in the Balkans). Worldwide, ap-
proximately only twenty-eight states recognize Taipei rather than Beijing as the
representative government of China. See id. Besides the Vatican, Macedonia is the
only country in Europe that has established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. See
Taiwan, Macedonia and East Timor (last modified Jan. 31, 1999)
<http://www.taiwandc.org/nvs-9904.htm> (reporting that Taiwan's newly estab-
lished political ties with Macedonia could serve as a foot-in-the-door to the rest of
Europe).
122. See Yung Wei, Political Development in the Republic of China on Tatwan,
in CHINA AND THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN: DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 74, 76
(Hungdah Chiu ed., 1973) (noting that the period from 1949 to 1953, when the
Nationalists moved the seat of government to Taiwan, was a period of struggle for
China). China has proclaimed Taiwan as a contumacious province since the 1949
civil war, which divided the two sides when Chiang Kai-Shek's defeated Nation-
alist forces fled the "mainland." China contends that Taiwan must be brought back
to mainland rule under a one-country, two system arrangement that will give Tai-
wan autonomy and concede authority to China-an arrangement similar to the one
between Hong Kong and China. Taiwan embraces the position that unification is
feasible, but declares that China must first democratize. See Guiguo Wang &
Priscilla M.F. Leung, One Country, Two Systems: Theory Into Practice, 7 PAC.
RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 279, 281 (1998) (describing the "'one country, two systems"
policy).
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Burundi, and Nuremberg-have lingered, lest China's threat to veto
such a proposal due to its former friendly relationship with the
Khmer Rouge.'23 In the summer of 1999, China contemporaneously
expressed vigorous support for Belgrade's leader Slobodan
Milosevic and vigorous opposition to the NATO air strikes in Yugo-
slavia. China's position had diplomats wondering whether China
would veto the Kosovo peace plan in the UN Security Council and
possibly prolong the war. China based its opposition to NATO air
strikes in Kosovo on the conviction that human rights do not usurp
sovereignty. China did not want the UN to justify intervention based
upon human rights because of China's concerns both in Taiwan and
Tibet.'
2 4
China's postmodern approach to international law is similar to
other nations. China has adopted both a flexible and pragmatic ap-
proach that exploits international law and rules based on national in-
terests rather than on ideological grounds. International law has be-
come a foreign policy tool to perpetuate China's national policies. 2 5
It is improbable that China will rely upon international law to resolve
the Spratly Island dispute due to two reasons.' 6 First, the Law of the
Sea provisions that establish an exclusive economic zone and a con-
tinental shelf are in favor of the other claimants' positions as coastal
states. International law also suggests that China's claim of occupa-
tion and discovery of the Spratly Islands may undergo challenges be-
123. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assenbly,
[1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 364, 374, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
124. See Andrew Phillips, Trouble on Two Fronts, 112 MACLEAN'S, May 24,
1999, at 38 (noting that China, along with Russia, is uncomfortable with the
growing Western trend to intervene in nations that extensively violate human
rights).
125. See Bennett, supra note 25, at 445 (explaining that China views interna-
tional law as a way to assert its foreign policy goals).
126. See Steven L. Chan, Differences Between British & Chinese Views of Law
Forebode Uncertainties for Hong Kong's People After the 1997 Transfer, 15
U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 138, 192-93 (1996) (discussing that in a different dis-
pute concerning China, which involved possible remedies for breach of the Basic
Law enacted by China to govern Hong Kong after Hong Kong was transferred to
China, it had been amply noted that a claim before the International Court of Jus-
tice was unlikely because China would refuse to recognize the Court's jurisdic-
tion); see also Chiu, supra note 87, at 294 (discussing China's move from a hard to
a soft position toward the International Court of Justice in the early 1980s).
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cause islands may require more substantial occupation than other
types of land masses for a continuous period to establish discovery.
China's legal claim of right to the Spratly Islands, therefore, is sub-
ject to various interpretations and a possible unfavorable judgment.
Second, there is also an abundance of "affect" around the Spratly Is-
land dispute because the numerous claimants perceive the dispute as
a challenge to their integrity, and the leaders link their positions and
success to their strength, effectiveness to lead, and the viability of the
government. Writer Choon-Ho predicted that the Spratly Islands dis-
pute will continue with each of the claimants "testing the others' pa-
tience and trying not to lose face."' 27 His prediction proved accurate
at the approach of the new millennium when, in an effort to vocalize
its claims to the Spratly Islands, the Philippines motioned to place
the issue of the Spratly Islands on the agenda of a March 1999 Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) held in Germany with a claim that the
Spratly issue related to both European and Asian political and secu-
rity concerns.2 8 The Philippines, however, was outvoted, due to
China's threat to walk out of the talks if the Spratly Island dispute




Another theory of international law is a positivist view, succinctly
127. Choon-Ho Park, The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and
the Natural Resources?, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 27, 54 (1978).
128. See Asia-Europe Foundation, An ASEM Companion: ASEM I to ASEM 2
(ASEM Summits) (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.asef.org/asem/asem-
1&2_summit.html>. ASEM was established in 1996 to improve political and eco-
nomic relations between Europe. It holds annual meetings for seven of the nine
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations along with China, Japan,
South Korea and fifteen members of the European Union.
129. See Eirmalasare Bani, No Coordinated Asian I oice at ASEM Meet, BUS.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1999, at 18 (noting that the Asian nations participating in the
ASEM meeting had agreed to discuss the Spratly Islands issues at a separate fo-
rum); Joel Vega, China Pulls Out Frigates From Disputed Territory', GULF NEWS,
Feb. 17, 1999 (noting how China requested that its diplomats in Europe ask ASEM
members not to allow discussion of the Spratly Island territorial dispute dunng the
upcoming ASEM meeting); Free Republic, Philippines Savs Can Upgrade Outpost
in Spratlys (last modified Mar. 3, 1999) <http://ww.freerepublic.com
/foruma36de4dfc599d.htm> (noting that in response to China's position, the
Philippines stated that it planned to upgrade its military facility on Pagasa (Hope)
Island, one of the eight areas the Philippines claims in the Spratly Islands).
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expressed in Professor Louis Henkin's remark that "almost all na-
tions observe almost all principles of international law and almost all
of their obligations almost all of the time."'3 Under this theory, in-
ternational law is similar to a contract theory in which the parties
agree to be bound. This agreement is usually in the form of a treaty
or customary law. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties is similar to contract theory with its requirement that a
third state is not bound to a treaty without its consent."' The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties also has contract undertones with
respect to when states are bound;' the right to modify or counterof-
fer (called reservations); "3 the interpretation of treaties;3 4 the inva-
lidity of treaties; '.and, the termination of treaties.'
3 6
China adopted this positivist view of international law and per-
ceives treaties as the fundamental source of international law and re-
lations and has embraced numerous treaties and honored them in a
fashion similar to other states.'37 China's respect for treaties has been
130. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47
(1979).
131. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
132. See id. The Convention notes that states are bound to a treaty through sig-
nature (article 12), an exchange of instruments (article 13), ratification (article 14),
and accession (article 15). See id. arts. 12-15.
133. See id. art. 2(d) (allowing a state to sign a treaty and "exclude or to modify
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty .... ); id. art. 19 (delineating the
perimeters to the right of reservations and allows reservations unless prohibited by
the treaty, the treaty itself specifies the allowable reservations, or the reservation is
incompatible with the objective and purpose of the treaty).
134. See id. art. 31 (setting forth, similar to basic contract law, article 31 states
that interpretation shall be in good faith and words are prescribed their ordinary
meaning).
135. See Vienna Convention, supra note 131, arts. 48-52 (declaring a treaty in-
valid for fraud, corruption, coercion, force or threat of force).
136. See id. arts. 55- 62 (allowing for termination on such grounds as consent,
implied right, a subsequent treaty, a material breach, impossibility of performance,
and a fundamental change of circumstances).
137. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 (1997) (noting that
China has entered into and carried out many international treaties and conven-
tions). Among other treaties, China has accepted the Constitution of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, the Charter of the United Nations, The Statute of the
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considerably far from an easy accomplishment due to its experience
with "unequal treaties"'38 which resulted in a loss of China's sover-
eignty and control of its territory by western powers."' One of the
earliest "unequal treaties" arose out of the Opium War between Brit-
ain and China. Britain needed China's silk, while China was indiffer-
ent to British goods. The result was a trade deficiency that Britain
sought to remedy with cotton and opium from India. After a decade
of struggle against the flow of opium into China, the emperor of
China decided to capture foreigners and destroy large quantities of
opium. In response, Britain waged war against China. The Opium
War lasted from 1839 to 1842. China was defeated and impelled to
enter into the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing. China refers to this treaty as
the first of a series of "unequal treaties" because under the terms of
the treaty, China ceded Hong Kong to the British; abolished the mo-
nopoly system of trade; opened ports to British residence and foreign
trade; limited tariffs; granted British nationals exemption from Chi-
nese law; paid a large indemnity; and granted a favored trade status
to Britain.' 4° It is estimated that approximately eighteen countries '
imposed approximately 158 unequal treaties'2 on China between
International Court of Justice, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [with reservations] and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. LAKSHAM D. GURUS\VAMY ET AL.,
SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSE BOOK 1495-1549 (1999).
138. See SHAW, supra note 137, at n.124 (noting that China disavows treaties
where its territory was annexed by other powers).
139. See COHEN & CHIU, supra note 86, at 119 (explaining that a history of
"unequal treaties" led China to adopt five principles into its treaties: (1) mutual re-
spect for territorial integrity, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3) mutual noninterference
in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence).
140. See China: The Opium War, 1839-42 (visited June 18, 1999)
<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-binlquery/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+CN0O25)> (pro-
viding an overview of the Opium War and the Treaty of Nanjing).
141. See COHEN & CHIU, supra note 86, at 3-22 (listing the countries as Austria-
Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the
United States). See also Philip R. Abbey, Treat " Ports & Ertraterritorialit, in
1920s China (updated July 22, 1999) <http://www.geocities.com/Vienna/
5048/TREATY01.html> (listing the countries that had treaties with China estab-
lishing consular court jurisdiction over their nationals).
142. BRIAN H.W. HILL, INDEX-GUIDE To TREATIES (PARTY INDEX VOLUME I)
2000] 555
AM. U. INT'LL. REV.
1842 and 1949. China considers that period as the "century of hu-
miliation" because China was reduced to a semi-colony for western
powers. The primary complaint and criticism of the numerous une-
qual treaties is the lack of reciprocity in negotiations.' China's expe-
rience with treaties and contact with foreigners was depicted by for-
eigners obtaining increased influence over China and increased
shares of China's commercial value.'4 Consequently, during the
early period of the communist party in China its government denied
the existence of treaties and outstanding international obligations."
China's current position on the world stage is to consider treaties
as part of its political process, subject to influences of power, expe-
diency and ideology. China considers treaties as the most important
source of international law because they reflect the actual agreement
between nations. The result is that China follows the rules of inter-
national law unless the rules are at variance with Chinese policies
and interest-particularly sovereignty interests.16 Any treaty for the
Spratly Islands dispute must comport with China's domestic agenda
and interests to allow the government to maintain its image. It is im-
probable that China will relinquish any sovereignty interests in the
Spratly Islands. If the claimants can agree on a system of distribution
and reduce it to a treaty, then the sovereignty issue could, as China
has suggested, give way to a joint venture system wherein the coun-




143. See Gretchen Harders-Chen, China MFN: A Reaffirmation of Tradition or
Regulator), Reform?, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 381, 392-93 (1996) (stating that
China's modern day concern for reciprocity in foreign relations stems from the
lack of reciprocity in the "unequal treaties").
144. PETER WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY 1898-1997: CHINA, GREAT
BRITAIN AND HONG KONG'S NEW TERRITORIES 27-28 (1998) (providing examples
of foreign imperialism in China).
145. See 0. EDMUND CLUBB & EUSTACE SELIGMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL
POSITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA 33 (1965) (discussing the international political
component of power in China).
146. See Chiu, supra note 87, at 294-95 (explaining that China's position of
viewing treaties as the most important source of international law is the prevailing
view among scholars and is the position embraced by most nations).
147. See Margaret L. Tomlinson, Recent Developments in the International Law
of the Sea, 32 INT'L LAw 599, 605 (1998) (describing a summit meeting of states
[15:527556
SPRATL Y ISLANDS DISPuTE
C. NATURAL LAW
Natural law theorists view humans as intelligent and reasonable
beings who reach objectively rational and logical moral decisions or
principles without restrictions to any national identity. Natural law,
according to Saint Thomas Aquinas, constituted part of the law of
God, and was exercised by rational beings in the eternal law. Aqui-
nas declared that reason is the essence of man and part of the order-
ing of life according to divine will and that natural law is the root of
moral behavior.' It is generally recognized that certain rights in in-
ternational law are rooted in natural law, such as the recognition of
human rights, nonaggression,' 4 and equality of states.'"
The objective morality of natural law theorist is a theme with his-
torical roots in China. Chinese philosophy pullulated in a "humanist
morality." If the 4,000 years of Chinese philosophy can be summa-
rized in one word it would be "humanism."'" The Chinese concep-
tion of humanism throughout the ancient, medieval, modem and
that reaffirmed a 1992 declaration calling for joint exploration of resources of the
disputed territories). Both China and the Philippines have taken this approach. See
Roberto R. Romulo, Philippine Foreign Policy: New Policy In a Changing World
Environment, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 131, 134 (1993) (stating that China
proposed joint exploration and development of the resources in the Spratly Is-
lands).
148. See SHAW, supra note 137, at 19 (describing a merging of natural law and
Christian ideas). Natural law concepts such as freedom and liberty are rooted in the
United States Declaration of Independence. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 290-91
(1996) (stating that the "language of rights" came naturally to the American colo-
nists).
149. See generally Anthony D'Amato, International Law and Rawls' Theor " of
Justice, 5 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 525, 525 (1975) (discussing one theory of
justice in international law).
150. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (stating that the principle of equality provides that
states are sovereign equals and that the principle has its roots in natural law which
has been credited with espousing the equality of man).
151. WING-TSIT CHAN, A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 3 (1963)
(tracing the evolution and interrelationship of Chinese philosophy with a discus-
sion of such schools of thought as Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Neo-
Confucianism, and Communism).
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contemporary schools of Chinese philosophy is essentially forged in
morality. The fall of the Shang dynasty (1751 to 1121 B.C.) estab-
lished the birth of the Zhou (Chou) dynasty (1122 to 249 B.C.). The
latter dynasty differed from the former because its legitimacy was
founded upon the premise that morality was the basis of civilization
and leadership, while the former dynasty had a realist "might makes
right" approach that based its existence on military force." 2 The
Shang dynasty emphasized a supreme being and ancestors who ma-
nipulated one's destiny, similar to Greek mythology, while the Zhou
placed more emphasis on human ability to control destiny through
moral deeds. China thereby developed a universal "great norm" of
morality or virtue, which dates back to 1111 B.C."5 3
Irrespective of China's philosophical entrenchment in morality, it
was a civilization walled-in, with a forbidden city that essentially en-
gendered what professor Robin West would characterize as a "mini-
mally pluralist moral climate."5 ' China's history is inimical towards
the recognition of a worldwide morality.' Mirjan R. Damaska in-
152. See id.
153. See id. at 4.
154. See Robin L. West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765, 771
(1992) (using this term to describe another topic, namely, constitutional adjudica-
tion, as a "fractured, relativist, nihilist, minimally pluralist moral climate").
China's independent development is a factor of its people, geography, and isola-
tionism until the sixteenth century. See Rong-Chwan Chen, A Boat On A Troubled
Strait: The Interregional Private Law of the Republic of China On Taiwan, 16
WIS. INT'L L.J. 599, 603 (1998) (stating that drastic changes began to take place
during the Ming Dynasty).
155. Historically, the classical world in China differed from the classical Greek,
Roman, and Judeo-Christian worlds' assumptions and these assumptions impact
perceptions and definitions of reason, rational, knowledge, and morality. For ex-
ample, Chinese philosophy assumed a single continuous world while Western
philosophy focused on a two-world theory in which concepts were dichotomized
into such categories as "reality/appearance, knowledge/opinion, truth/falsity, Be-
ing/Nonbeing, Creator/creature, soul/body, reason/experience, cause/effect, objec-
tive/subjective, theory/practice, agent/action, nature/culture, form/matter, univer-
sal/particular, logical/rhetorical, cognitive/affective, masculine/feminine and so
on." ROBERT G. HENDRICKS (series editor), SUN-TZU THE ART OF WARFARE
TRANSLATED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY BY ROGER T. AMES
(Ballantine Book 1993); see also BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, THE WORLD OF THOUGHT
IN ANCIENT CHINA 3 (1985) (suggesting that each culture generates a minority of
thinkers who stand back and create a new and positive creative perspective and ac-
cordingly, any rules China adopts it would do so from an entirely different per-
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sightfiully posited that it is virtually impossible to discuss China's ju-
risprudence from the framework of western particularities." ' China
shares the reservations of other Asian and African nations that have
espoused a critical perspective that depicts natural law as Euro-
centric saturated in Christian values.' 7
The viability of natural law is essentially manifested in treaties,
customs, and general principles of law. Absent such sources, natural
law posits what China should do concerning the disputed Spratly Is-
lands rather than what it will do. What should be done is complicated
by a multitude of international and national values.' Domestically,
China's conflicts with Xizang (Tibet) since the 1950s,'5" the Xin-
jiang-Uygur region (China's Islamic region),'6" and its contemporary
spective).
156. See MIRJAN R DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY
2 (1986). "Farther east, in China one encounters systems of justice so different
from ours that a discourse inscribed with the particularities of Western develop-
ment fails us almost completely." See id.
157. See Triggs, supra note 86, at 654-56 (reflecting the views of many devel-
oping and socialist states); see also J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-13 (1989). It has been argued that America's approach to
comparative theories of law lacks both flexibility and accuracy.
158. The diversity of values is depicted in the evolution of several legal systems
throughout the world: (1) the Romanist-Germanic-Civilist legal systems, (2) the
Common Law legal system, (3) the Marxist-Socialist legal system, (4) the Islamic
legal system, and (5) the Asian legal system. RENE DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTEMtES
DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINES 22-32 (5th ed. 1973), cited in LAKSHMAN D.
GURUS\VAMY ET AL., SUPPLEMENT TO BASIC DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSE BOOK 116
n.4 (1999).
159. During the Mao Zedong era China perceived the traditional Tibetan culture
as an oppressive feudal serfdom similar to the one existing during the European
dark ages. In the later part of the twentieth century China began to make repara-
tions and rebuild the temples. See generally Hilary K. Josephs et al., Independence
for Tibet: An International Analysis, 8 CHINA L. REP. (1994).
160. See generally DRU C. GLADNEY, MUSLIM CHINESE: ETHNIC NATIONALISM
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1991) (discussing the history of Islam in China and the
tension between Chinese Muslims and other ethnic groups in China). There are ap-
proximately fifty million Muslims in China. See Marco Restelli, China's Secret
Holy War, WORLD PRESS REV., May 1994, at 43. China's official state figures in-
dicate that the number of Muslims in China is 18 million. See Background Notes:
China, October 1998, Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs, (visited Oct. 1,
1998) <http://wvww.state.gov/www/background-noteschina- I 098-bgn.htm>.
China's Muslims live in six provinces: Chinghai, Kansu, Shensi, Yunnan, Ningh-
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conflicts with the Falun Gong religious/martial arts sect, are centered
around ethnic, religious, and ideological differences that undermine a
"unified morality" domestically, while its stance on human rights de-
picts the absence of a "unified morality" internationally.' Among
the various Spratly Island claimants, there is an absence of a uniform
morality beyond general principles of nonviolence, mutual coopera-
tion and negotiation. These terms provide a useful framework, which
creates an atmosphere to discuss the conflict, but fails to offer con-
crete and specific guidelines or rules to resolve the Spratly Island
dispute.
D. REALIST
The realist view of international law is that ethics, morality, or
ideology are mere euphemisms and elements of the power equation.
According to the realist perspective international law is about power
politics and the balance of power.' 2 The proponents of this view in-
clude Edward Hallett Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Dean Acheson, Henry
Kissinger, and George Kennan. Former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger remarked that relations between states exist on one of three
sia, and Xinjiang with a history dating back to the early days of Islam. See Omar
Haroon, The Muslims of China Trace a Rich Historyfiom the Early Days of Islam,
7 AL-TALIB THE MUSLIM NEWSMAGAZINE AT UCLA 1, 14 (1996). The internal
Muslim conflict in China has the potential to impact Central Asia if China's Mus-
lims seek an alliance with other Muslims in Central Asia. Such an alliance threat-
ens the status quo in China and Central Asia and it would realize the fears of the
western world which has historically disfavored a unified and controlling Muslim
presence in Asia. See PETER HOPKIRK, THE GREAT GAME xviii (1992).
161. See Todd R. Benson, Taking Security in China: Approaching U.S. Prac-
tices?, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 183, 188-89 (1996) (stating that China's adoption of
international norms and "foreign style" law merely supplements China's custom-
ary practices which do not exist in the books, but which are an integral part of
China's legal system); see also R.P. Peerenboom, What's Wrong with Chinese
Rights?: Toward a Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics, 6 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 29, 30, 57 (1993) (discussing how rights theories are not theories of natural
rights and how the Chinese perception of rights-in particular human rights-will
always have a Chinese characteristic). See generally ELISABETH ZOLLER,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH U.S. LEGISLATION (1985) (advocating
extending the characteristics of the American legal system to international law).
162. See FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 7-13 (1985) (stating that "international law, morality, ethics, ideology and
even knowledge itself are mere components in the power equation").
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levels: domination, balance of power, or total chaos,'"' inferring that
notions of friendship, morality, and good intentions are irrelevant.
The realist view embraces the premise that "might makes right" and
that states are the only entities entitled to engage in international re-
lations.
The use or threatened use of force is central to the realist notion.
Hans Morgenthau theorized that a state's primary goal is to maxi-
mize its power and that the sources of power are economic, political
and military development.'6 China has developed in the respective
areas pinpointed by Morgenthau. 65 It is a power-politics nation that
has demonstrated an appreciation for armed conflict and deterrence.
China used force or the threat of force to curtail pro-independence
rhetoric in Taiwan and cries of democracy in Beijing. ' China devel-
oped nuclear weapons as a deterrent to invasion or western manipu-
lation.6 1 One commentator noted that China, perhaps with justifica-
163. See BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 2. at 29 (stating additionally that
"morality, good intentions and friendly feelings play little or no role," thus show-
ing that Henry Kissinger was the quintessential realist during the Nixon admini-
stration); see also WILLIAM BURR, THE KISSINGER TRANSCRIPTS: THE TOP SECRET
TALKS WITH BEIJING AND Moscow 70-82 (1999) (providing the transcript of a
conversation on August 4, 1972, between Henry Kissinger and Huang Hua, the
People's Republic of China Ambassador to the United Nations). He later expressed
a "softer" view and indicated that the world has become more interdependent and
global and that the USSR and the United States can no longer maintain bipolar
global domination. See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 23-28 (1994). However,
his "softer" position merely recognizes a shift of power rather than the demise of
the realist view.
164. See Richard D. Beller, Analizing the Relationship Between International
Law and International Politics in China's and Vietnam "s Territorial Dispute Over
the Spratly Islands, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293, 313-19 (1994) (providing a discussion
of the realist perspective with a particular emphasis on the scholarship of Hans
Morgenthau).
165. See supra notes 98-126 and accompanying test (discussing China's inter-
national economic and political development).
166. See, e.g., ORVILLE SCHELL, MANDATE OF HEAVEN 15-30 (1994) (providing
the history and symbolism of the violence in Tiananmen Square).
167. Chronologically, China's nuclear weapons technology developed as fol-
lows: January 1955 Mao Zedong approved the development of nuclear weapons
programs; April 1955 the Soviet Union agreed to assist China with research on
atomic energy and nuclear physics; March 1956 hundreds of Chinese nuclear sci-
entist were trained in Moscow; October 1957 the Soviet Union agreed to provide
China with data on the manufacture of atomic bombs; January 1958 the Soviet
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tion, has used force more frequently since 1949 than any other na-
tion. 6 1 China has used force, directly or indirectly, in numerous con-
flicts throughout the world including aid to the Afghan guerillas in
their effort to overthrow the People's Democratic Party of Afghani-
stan (PDPA) headed by president Nur Mohammed Taraki; 6 9 military
aid and training for the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola
(FNLA) forces in their independence struggle against Portugal; 
7
1
arms to the People's Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf
(PFLOAG) rebels against the Sultan of Oman because of Oman's
strategic position in the Persian Gulf; 7' arms to Iran in its war against
Iraq;" arms to Yemen in its dispute against the United Kingdom;"
attacks against Vietnam for its invasions of Kampuchea (Cambo-
dia); 7 1 combat against the Soviet Union over border disputes;, 75
Union provided China with two R-2 missiles and blueprints; May 1959 the Soviet
Union delivered two TU-16 bomber aircraft; June 1959 China decided to develop
it own atomic bomb; October 1964 China exploded its first atomic bomb (in the
Northwest region of Xinjiang); June 1967 China tested its first hydrogen bomb;
December 1968 China tested three-megaton atomic bomb; September 1969 China
conducted another three-megaton atomic bomb explosion; October 1970 China ex-
ploded a three-megaton hydrogen bomb; November 1976 China conducted a fur-
ther hydrogen bomb test; 1980 China conducted its final atmospheric test; 1988 the
United States suspected, but China never confirmed, that China conducted neutron
bomb test; July 1996 China succeeded in miniaturizing warheads; September 1996
China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; December 1996 China had an
estimated 400 active warheads; November 1999, the United States alleged China
stole nuclear secrets; a 1999 report concluded that China stole the United States'
weapons secrets and shared them with enemies of the United States; July 1999
China attempted to refute the report and announced it had no need to spy because it
had the technology to build neutron bomb and miniature warheads. See Chronol-
ogy of China's Nuclear Weapons Technology Development, INSIDE CHINA TODAY,
(visited July 16, 1999) <http://www.insidechina.com/ features.php3?id=79395>
(providing a chronology of China's nuclear weapons development).
168. See Lilley, supra note 26, at 746 (discussing the instances where force was
used against Burma, India, Korea, the Soviet Union, the Taiwan Strait, and Viet-
nam).
169. See generally A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF
STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II (1997) (describing the conflict in 1979-89).
170. See id. at 201 (describing the conflict in 1975).
171. See id. at 187 (explaining the conflict in 1965-76).
172. See id. at 50 (commenting on the conflict in 1980-88).
173. See id. at 258 (describing the conflict in 1957).
174. See WEISBURD, supra note 169, at 43 (explaining the conflict in 1979).
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bombing of the Quemoy and Matsu islands in the Taiwan Straits;'
fighting with Vietnam and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands;'"
invasion of Vietnam; the Korean War; 9 arms and training for the
Partido Afficano da Independencia de Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)
forces in Guinea-Bissau in their struggle for independence against
Portugal;'" arms and training for the Frente de Libertacao de Mo-
cambique (FRELIMO) guerillas in Mozambique in their struggle for
independence against Portugal;'8' arms and training to the Zimbabwe
African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) in their struggle against
Rhodesian security forces;'82 a border war with India;'' and conflicts
in Tibet and Burma.
In the new millennium, China may rely less on force and more on
economic empowerment," with the concomitant deterrent effect of a
175. See id. at 268 (commenting on the conflict in 1969).
176. See id. at 178 (exploring the conflict in 1958).
177. See id. at 272 (discussing the conflict between China, Vietnam and the
Philippines over the Spratly Islands).
178. See id. at 280 (discussing China's role in the invasion of Vietnam).
179. See WEISBURD, supra note 169, at 103-05 (describing China's involvement
in the Korean war).
180. See id. at 79 (discussing how China provided arms and military training to
the PAIGC).
181. See id. at 83 (pointing our how China provided arms and training to the
FRELIMO in Mozambique).
182. See id. at 91 (discussing China's grant to ZANLA of arms and training in
ZANLA's conflict against Rhodesia).
183. See id. at 261 (describing the involvement of China in a border war with
India).
184. See Jacques Delisle, Of Chinese Walls, Battering Rams. and Building Per-
nits: Five Lessons About International Economic Law Front Sino-U.S. Trade and
huvestnent Relations, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 513, 518-19 (1996) (explaining
that China and the United States perceive each other as enemies, and that aggres-
sion is appropriate to a relationship dominated by economic and commercial issues
such as MFN status, entry into GATT/WTO, and intellectual property law); see
also John G. Roos, The New Long March, ARMED FORCES J. INT'L 42 (1997) (dis-
cussing how China wants to become the uncontested power in Asia and plans to
achieve this goal via both military and economic power). He believed that outright
military occupation of the Spratly Islands by China would jeopardize that goal. See
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military big stick.'85 It is unlikely China will use force to resolve the
Spratly Island dispute in the immediate future because the interna-
tional community would probably react strongly.' Moreover, pursu-
ant to the UN Charter, states are required to refrain from the threat or
use of force to resolve international matters."' Similarly, the Asso-
ciation of South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), which is comprised
of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Brunei, has espoused the goal of peaceful resolutions for regional
disputes, through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. "" Nonethe-
less, China's military development is enormous, and in the early part
of the new millennium its military might and its economic clout will
coalesce. Its need for oil and gas will double as its population in-
creases by millions.' 89 Commentators predict that 268 million Chi-
nese citizens will be unemployed or underemployed in the new mil-
lennium. This may result in a possible regionalism, positioning the
prosperous eastern coast of China against the western region where
they will resent the imposition of taxes and the lack of economic
autonomy.'9° Acquisition of the Spratly Islands and its oil reserves
185. See E.A. Feignbaum, Soldiers, Weapons, and Chinese Development Strat-
egy: The Mao Era Military in China's Economic and Institutional Debate, 158
CHINA Q. 285, 312-13 (1999) (describing how China may change its international
policy in the new millennium by using its economic power instead of force).
186. The above statement is not offered to eliminate the possible use of force by
China to gain control over the Spratly Islands. The statement merely places force
as an option second to others. There is a possibility that as China continues to ex-
pand economically and militarily that it will use force to resolve what it perceives
as the Spratly "border dispute". In modem times nations are likely to use force
when the conflict involves a "border" dispute. For example, conflicts in the Arab-
Israeli wars, Iraq's invasion of Iran, the Falkland War, "[a]nd flurries of hostili-
ties... between India and Pakistan, Greece and Turkey (over Cyprus), Libya and
Egypt, Cambodia and Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia, India and China, Ethiopia
and Somalia." HENKIN, supra note 32, at 5 1.
187. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
188. See Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia (Feb. 24, 1976)
(visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.asean.org.id>.
189. See generally Qu GEPING & Li JINCHANG, POPULATION & TIIE
ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA (Jiang Baozhong & Gu Ran trans., 1994) (discussing on
how China's population impacts its land, forest, grassland, mineral resources, wa-
ter and energy).
190. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam & Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, China After Deng:
Toughest Tests in Economic Area, 17 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Sept. 15, 1995, at II-
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may become necessary to support China's growing population and
increasing rates of consumption.' 9' Such economic exigencies and the
perception that "might makes right" engenders a volatile status quo
with several possible future outcomes.
V. PROJECTIONS
China's realist philosophy, combined with a massive military
buildup, reunification with Taiwan, a strategy to control the South
China Sea and extend its influence into the Indian Ocean, "2 could re-
sult in a conflict with the other claimants and the United States. Con-
flict is avoidable if the claimants overcome factors dealing with the
status quo, the shortcomings of current international law, tense
United States-China relations, and the inability to agree upon a sys-
tem of joint development.
The plight of the status quo concern was initially referred to by
Mark Valencia when he stated "[d]espite all hope of improvement,
the most likely scenario for the future of the South China Sea dis-
putes is the status quo."' 9' The problem with maintaining the status
quo is the emotional, cultural and economic variables dormant in the
Spratly Island dispute. These variables nurture a volatile status quo,
which is reflective of Thomas Hobbes' statement that "in the nature
of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel." First, Competi-
tion; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory."' The Spratly Islands
dispute creates grave potential for conflict from the competition for
oil and fishing revenues. This quest for revenues is inextricably
linked to the political glory and honor that the leadership of the
claimant states associate with the acquisition of the Spratly Islands.
12 (discussing how China in the new millennium is predicted to encounter eco-
nomic problems because of unemployment and regionalism).
191. See Jay Tolston, Of Kings and Commoners, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 16-23, 1999, at 68 (noting that in the past one thousand years China has been
one of the countries with the world's largest populations).
192. See Hsu, supra note 116, at 978.
193. MARK J. VALENCIA, CHINA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPLTES 54
(Adelphi Paper 298, 1995).
194. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND,
As CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY (1651), reprinted in THE GREAT
LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS, at 110 (Clarence Morris ed., 1971).
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If the stagnation and latent conflict continue, ' 9 and China's military
might increasingly exceeds that of the other claimants, China will
more likely violate international law. The reason for this is because
China will fail to see any other recourse.
Another factor that could generate military conflict is the current
deficiency of international law. Each party to the Spratly Islands dis-
pute claims the territory in whole, or in part, which makes the sover-
eignty issue complex and unresolvable by the Law of the Sea and
existing international law. The Law of the Sea Treaty is inadequate
to resolve territorial disputes because it often creates overlapping
claims,'96 ambiguous boundaries,1 97 and protects property interests
only after sovereignty is established. The existing international tribu-
nals are also unlikely to resolve the Spratly Island dispute because
the claimants are reluctant to submit disputes to an adversarial sys-
tem. There is a general belief among the Southeast Asian nations that
international organizations, such as the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"), advocate western philosophy and reach unsatisfactory re-
sults. These nations further believe that the disputes in the region are
of a sensitive nature, involving sovereignty and domestic policies,
which require "good neighborliness," and conciliatory and flexible
legal procedures.'98
195. See generally C.R. MITCHELL, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 17 (1981) (describing how incompatible goals are the precursors for la-
tent conflict).
196. See Barry Hart Dubner, On the Interplay of International Law of the Sea
and the Prevention of Maritime Pollution: How Far Can a State Proceed in Pro-
tecting Itself From Conflicting Norms in International Law, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REv. 137, 140 (1998) (discussing the inadequacy of the Law of the Sea Treaty
when used in solving territorial disputes); see also John E. Noyes, International
Law of the Sea, 31 INT'L LAW. 703, 712 (1996) (discussing how other claims have
not been exacerbated by recent claims of exclusive economic zones involving such
claimants as Japan and Korea (Liancourt rocks) and Japan and China/Taiwan
(Senkaku)); see also Roseann Bassler, International Disputes Over Control of the
Oceans, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 855 (1995) (discussing the numerous over-
lapping national claims under the Law of the Sea and the resulting disputes in-
volving Aegean Sea, the Spratly Islands, the Timor Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Ca-
nadian Continental Shelf, the Gulf of Thailand, and the Yellow Sea).
197. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Progress In International Maritime
Boundary Delimitation Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 227 (1994) (discussing how, on its
face, international maritime law found in the Law of the Sea is undefined).
198. See Triggs, supra note 86, at 658-59 (pointing out that Asian countries are
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A third factor that could generate military conflict is the tension
between the United States and China. The end of the twentieth cen-
tury demonstrates the tension between the United States and China.
In 1995, the United States allowed the Taiwanese President to visit
the United States, and in response China held war games and fired
missiles into the Taiwan Strait. The United States responded with the
placement of two aircraft carrier groups in the Taiwan Strait to pro-
tect Taiwan.'" In 1999, the Clinton Administration vetoed the sale of
a $450 million Hughes communication satellite-alleging security
risks-when the Singapore-based consortium, Asia Pacific Mobile
Telecommunications (APTM) was suspected to have close ties with
China.2°0 In addition, in 1999, the United States government accused
scientist named Wen Ho Lee, who was born in Taiwan, of stealing
nuclear secrets from the Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico,:"'
and Charlie Trie, John Huang, and Johnny Chung were associated
with campaign fundraising abuses. '°" In May 1999, the United States
bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, killing three
journalists and injuring numerous others. China deemed the attack
deliberate, while the United States claimed it was an accident. In July
of the same year the United States indicated that it would strongly
oppose China's use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue after Tai-
wan's president indicated that Taiwan was an independent state. Al-
though the United States supported the one-China model for Beijing
and Taiwan, the United States considers China's force as a threat to
the stability of the region. Secretary of State Madeline Albright em-
phasized human rights violations in China would impede United
skeptical about the ICJ's role in resolving legal disputes in the region).
199. See House Votes to Strengthen Militar' Ties with Taiwan, N.Y. TIMES ON
THE WEB (Feb. 2, 2000) <http://wwwv.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/020200 tai-
want-us.html> (noting that the United States in 1996 dispatched two missiles in
response to actions whereby China fired missiles at Taiwan).
200. See Jeff Gerth & David E. Sanger, Citing Securi,. U.S. Spurns China on
Satellite Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at Al (discussing the United States' re-
jection of the Hughes deal with Asia-Pacific Telecommunications).
201. See MR. COX OF CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY/COMMERCIAL
CONCERNS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, H.R. Doc. NO. 105-851
(105th Sess. 1999).
202. Alan Elsner, Democratic Fund-Raiser Trie Surrenders (visited Nov. 6,
1999) <http:/ /www.thecommonman.com/trie-000 1.htm>.
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States-China trade relations.0 3 The tension between the United States
and China reached a crescendo at the dawn of the new millennium. It
could be argued that matters will only worsen as China develops
militarily, potentially unites with Taiwan, 2° and fails to achieve an
end to the Spratly Island dispute. The United States may find itself
embroiled in a conflict with China due to ineffective dialogue and
fears of China's expansionism. The United States tends to perceive
China's growth as a threat to its interests.0 5 It would, therefore, be-
hoove the United States and the other claimants to reach an agree-
ment over the Spratly Islands while China demonstrates a willing-
ness to cooperate with other nations in bilateral negotiations.""
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The problems of the status quo, the shortcomings of international
law, and the tense United States-China relations can be resolved if
the dispute is settled pursuant to an equitable system of distribution
that respects the claimants' respective legal claims to the Spratly Is-
203.Jane Perlez, Albright Debates Rights and Trade with the Chinese, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1999, at Al (discussing Madeleine Albright's position regarding
China's human rights violations and trade).
204. See White Paper-The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (visited
Feb. 23, 2000) <http://www.china-embassy.org/papers/taiwanOO.htm> (stating that
"[s]ettlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the complete reunification of
China embody the fundamental interest of the Chinese nation. The Chinese gov-
ernment has worked persistently toward this goal in the past 50 years").
205. See Ralph N. Clough, The Status of Taiwan in the New International Legal
Order in the Western Pacific, 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 61, 73 (1993). Instead
of fear and alarm, the countries should continue to work towards a bright future of
which would include trade and academic exchange. See id. (stating that it was es-
timated that in 1992, 43,000 Chinese students were studying in the United States);
see also COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PRESIDENT'S FIVE-
YEAR REPORT 1993-1998, at 16-17 (pointing out that during the 1997-98 academic
year Columbia University enrollment of international students was 15.9 percent,
the highest proportion ever); Jim Rogers, The China Century is Only 3 Years Away
(visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.mbnglobal.com/subEmgMKTChina.htm>
(stating that more can be done in pre-college years, like emulating the Australian
school system where every child "must learn either Chinese, Japanese, Korean, or
some other Asian language.").
206. See BING BING JIA, THE REGIME OF STRAITS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 175
(1998) (stating that despite China's claim over the Spratly Islands it has not inter-
fered with free passage, and has supported innocent passage through the seas and
expressed a willingness to engage in bilateral negotiation).
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lands. Eventually, the Spratly Island dispute will reach one of five
possible conclusions. The first possible outcome is that one of the
claimant countries will take all of the territory through a tribunal,
dispute resolution, or military force. Second, the most powerful na-
tions will share the wealth of the Spratly Islands and the less power-
ful would become disenfranchised. Third, all the disputants share the
wealth equally. Fourth, all the states share in proportion to an articu-
lated distribution scheme. Lastly, none of the states have access to
the wealth. The first and second possible conclusions are conflict-
laden and require an ongoing military occupation of the entire South
China Sea. Such an outcome would prove expensive, counterproduc-
tive, and economically infeasible. The fifth potential conclusion is
impracticable and unlikely to occur unless all the claimants are in-
vaded and colonized or the South China Sea itself suffered a tremen-
dous disaster. A cursory view generates a certain appeal for the third
conclusion but such a scenario is not legally probable or practically
possible because it lacks recognition of the claimants' various legal
positions. Finally, the fourth potential conclusion, which provides a
distribution of the wealth, rights, and benefits of the Spratly Islands
pursuant to an articulated scheme, appears to be the only viable solu-
tion. What distribution scheme is viable? The answer, to quote
Shakespeare's Hamlet, "ay there's the rub ... "
A. VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS
Unless the claimant countries of Brunei, ChinaiTaiwan, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Vietnam reach an agreement to share the re-
sources of the Spratly Islands, China will eventually become frus-
trated and more militarily aggressive. Clearly, any resolution of the
dispute will involve China and will, therefore, have an impact upon
both Asia and the United States far into the new millennium. Sug-
gestions to resolve the Spratly Island dispute vary. There is the con-
tention that all the rights and privileges associated with the Spratly
Islands accrue to China because it has absolute sovereignty over the
Spratly Islands based on historical realities. Moreover, the Chinese
argue that any other solution is simply western politics that focus on
incorrect issues, such as China's intentions in Asia.", Other writers
207. See Shen, supra note 43, at 4-5, 72-75 (1997) (discussing how China
should have absolute sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and that any other sug-
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provide general suggestions which beseech United States-China co-.• 208 • 209
operation,'" a peaceful resolution, a negotiated settlement, ° the
benefits of closer relationship with China under a joint development
agreement, 1 or a United States presence as an overseer to prevent an
Asian country from unilaterally carving out part of the South China
Sea.212 Some commentators have offered more specific suggestions
and a framework for resolving or tolerating the Spratly Island dis-
pute.
Noted author B.A. Hamzah suggested using the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty as a model to resolve the Spratly Island dispute."' Australia,
New Zealand, France, Norway, Argentina, Chile, and Great Britain
had overlapping claims to the Antarctic.1 14 Hamzah focuses on Arti-
cle IV of the Antarctic Treaty that provides that the parties, non-
parties, and potential parties retain their asserted rights or claims in
sovereignty over the Antarctic. In his analysis of Article IV, Hamzah
gestions as to the Spratly Islands are politically based).
208. See Lilley, supra note 26, at 749 (providing alternatives to solving the
Spratly Islands dispute).
209. See Brian K. Murphy, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Island Dispute and
International Law, 1 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 187, 208-10 (1995) (arguing for a
peaceful resolution between China and the United States).
210. Cf Bennett, supra note 25, at 450 (stating that confrontation could lead to a
widespread of hostilities).
211. See Charles Liu, Chinese Sovereignty and Joint Development: A Pragmatic
Solution to the Spratly Islands Dispute, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 865,
883-92 (1996) (discussing the benefits of a trusted relationship, as a consequence
of a joint development agreement between China and the United States).
212. See Toni M. Bugni, The Continued Invasion: Assessing the United States
Military Presence On Okinawa Through 1996, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
85, 99 (1997) (discussing the United States' involvement in preventing unilateral
exploitation of the South China Sea); see also Edward L. Miles, U.S. Security In-
terests in a Post-Cold War World and the Law of the Sea, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 373, 394 (1997) (arguing that the United States cannot be aloof,
and must take an active role in Asia and foster regional balance).
213. See B.A. HAMZAH, THE SPRATLIES: WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ENHANCE
CONFIDENCE 20 (1990) (suggesting that a way to resolve the Spratly Island dispute
is to make use of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959). See generally Mito, supra note 6
(suggesting the use of the Timor Gap Treaty as a model in order to solve the
Spratly Islands dispute).
214. For an in-depth discussion of the parties involved, and the various articles
of the Antarctic Treaty, see F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS (1982).
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states, "[t]he freezing of the claim 'concept' is in line with the pro-
posal for a concurrent jurisdiction regime along the line of a joint de-
velopment-type model." 25 He suggests that a Spratly Islands treaty
could include the characteristics of the Antarctic Treaty such as a
moratorium on asserting new territorial claims or enlarging existing
ones while the treaty is in force, ecological cooperation, and the ex-
change of scientific information. He concedes that the Antarctic
Treaty is a deficient model for the Spratly Islands because the former
calls for non-militarisation and the Spratly Islands already have
military stations in the area, which the claimants are unlikely to dis-
mantle, and that the Spratly Islands have a greater strategic signifi-
cance to the claimants than the Antarctic had to its claimants. :"
Hamzah's primary contribution to the discourse involving the Spratly
Islands is his suggestion of how to defuse the tension in the area."
He suggests confidence-building measures to minimize conflict in
the region. His measures include: unilateral restraint of force; recog-
nition of national sensitivities; avoidance of tension raising activities;
cessation of further occupation; restraint of military expansion;
adoption of friendly measures and notification of military exercises;
and coordination and harmonization of maritime procedures.2"' Es-
sentially, Hamzah provides safeguards to preserve the peace in a
215. HAMZAH, supra note 213, at 21.
216. See id. at 19 (suggesting ways to utilize the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 to
settle the Spratly Islands dispute; see also EMILIO J. SAHURIE, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAWv OF ANTARCTICA 87 (1991) (stating that both regions share
prospects of bast oil reserves and that countries such as Japan, the Former Soviet
Union, Poland, Chile, Japan and the United States have financial commitments to
explore for oil in the Antarctic); GEORGE A. KNOX, THE LIVING RESOURCES OF
THE SOUTHERN OCEAN: A SCIENTIFIC OVERVIEW, reprinted in ANTARCTIC LAW
AND POLICY 21-26 (Francisco Orrego Vicuna ed., 1983) (describing how both re-
gions in the Antarctic having living resources, such as whales, krill, squids, seals,
birds and fish).
217. See HAMZAH, supra note 213. Interestingly, China's embassy contends that
there is no crisis in the region and rhetoric to the contrary is based on 'ulterior mo-
tives. See The Question of the South China Sea: Its Origin and Current Status
(visited Oct. 28, 1999) <http://www.china-embassy.org/Cgi-Bin/Press.p l?South
ChinaSea> (stressing China's commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes).
218. See HAMZAH, supra note 213, at 15-16; see also B.A. HAMZAH, MALAY.
INST. MARITIME AFFAIRS, CONFLICTING MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA: THE SCOPE FOR RESOLUTION 1990-1991.
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volatile region. He implicitly adopts Mark Valencia's position2 9 that
the Spratly Island dispute is plagued with the plight of the status quo.
Mark Valencia, another prolific writer on the South China Sea,
stated, "[d]espite all hope of improvement, the most likely scenario
for the future of the South China Sea is the status quo."22 Valencia
asserts that talks among the claimants are unfocused, technical and
occasionally interrupted with violence between the claimants."' He
characterizes the situation as a "leaking status quo." ' He offers so-
lutions that carve up or distribute the Spratly Islands to the claimants
based on three different scenarios:
Scenario 1: Allocate the entire South China Sea on the basis of
equidistant lines from claimed baselines, ignoring the Spratly and
Paracel Islands.
Scenario 2: Allocate the South China Sea out to 200nm from
baselines and/or out to the legal limit of the continental shelf, ignor-
ing the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
Scenario 3: Allocate the South China Sea out to 200nm and/or out
to the legal limit of the continental self on the basis of equidistant
lines from claimed baselines, including the Paracel, but ignoring the
Spratly.
23
Pursuant to Valencia's regime each claimant is allocated an area of
the Spratly Islands.224 Valencia's scenarios appear attractive, but they
are problematic. He admits that the major problem with each sce-
nario is that China's allocation fails to include the Spratly Istands.22
Such an outcome is clearly unacceptable to China. Valencia further
admits that the allocations could accentuate rather than minimize the
strategic concerns of the claimants if any of them claim the exclusive
219. See VALENCIA, supra note 193, at 54 (predicting that the future for the
Spratly Islands will be the status quo).
220. See id..
221. See id. at 54-55 (discussing the level of distrust among the claimants).
222. Id. at 55.
223. Id. at 57.
224. See id. (listing the three scenarios, in which each of the present occupants
would have sovereignty).
225. See VALENCIA, supra note 193, at 61 (arguing that China would probably
not accept any of the scenarios, since none of them include a Chinese allocation).
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economic zone and continental shelves adjacent to their allocation!,
He also admits his allocations would suffer from ineffective man-
agement controls as well.2-7 Furthermore, the area allocated is diffi-
cult to define and the claimants are unlikely to agree on an equitable
allocation.2
Valencia perceives the conflict involving the Spratly Islands as
one primarily concerned with sovereignty rather than revenues.22
This position ignores the fact that numerous disputes and military
skirmishes among the claimant states occurred after it was asserted
that the region contains vast oil reserves. It also downplays the dire
economic realities of the Philippines and Vietnam; both of which are
among the poorest countries in Southeast Asia. Neither can afford to
lose the right and privileges associated with the Spratly Islands."
Valencia's suggestions are useful as a starting point towards full
discussions among the claimants. Writer Hart Dubner has suggested
an amalgamation of Hamzah's confidence building program and
Valencia's joint development program."' While attention-getting,
Dubner's suggestion is plagued with the shortcomings of Valencia's
allocation scenarios and therefore unworkable.
Valencia conceptualizes the Spratly Island dispute as a vortex with
"strategic significance" at its center."2 This view marginalizes the
claimants' legitimate interest in revenues. Alternatively, author
226. See id. at 62 (admitting the difficulties associated with an allocation under
the three scenarios).
227. See id. (discussing the difficulties in enforcing any of the three scenarios).
228. See MARK J. VALENCIA ET AL., SHARING THE RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA 146 (1977) (criticizing the shortcomings of geographically-based allo-
cation exercises).
229. See id. at 18 (defining the competing claims as "sovereignty" issues).
230. See Nicholas Marsh, The Spradl Islands Dispute (visited June 8, 1999)
<http://snipe.ukc.ac.uk/intemationaUdissert.dir/marsh.html> (stating that "[olil rep-
resents the major lure for the littoral states). The Philippines and Vietnam are some
of the poorest states in South-east Asia. See id. In 1994, the GDP of Vietnam was
$190. Id. The Philippines has the second lowest GDP in ASEAN at S960. See id.
231. See Hart Dubner, The Spratly "Rocks '" Dispute: A "'Rockapelago " Defies
Nonns of nternational Law, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 291, 318-19 (1995) (de-
scribing Hamzah and Valencia's plans to resolve the Spratly Island dispute).
232. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 228, at 155 (highlighting the potential
uses of the area for defense, observation, and restricting sea travel).
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Choon-Ho Park describes the Spratly Island dispute as a conflict over
jurisdiction of both territory and resources.233 This approach is more
reflective of the multi-dimensional nature of the dispute and captures
the political, emotional, national, and economic factors underlying
the Spratly Islands dispute. The perception of something more than
property rights in land precipitates a different approach towards
solving the dispute. Certainly the Spratly Islands and the South
China Sea are "physical things" subject to traditional theories of
property law. A more useful framework, however, is to perceive
"ownership" of the Spratly Islands as a multi-dimension phenome-
non beyond something physical. Writer Michael A. Heller has cate-
gorized ownership as "physical things," "legal things," and "legal
relations. ' 34
B. THE POINT SYSTEM
This Article proposes defining the Spratly Islands as a dispute
about "relations" rather than "things." Instead of owning the Spratly
Islands, the claimants would focus on their relationship to the wealth
associated with the Spratly Islands. The "relations" approach would
function within a point system to establish the extent of a particular
claimant's relations to, and corresponding revenues from, the wealth
of the Spratly Islands. The point system would recognize a claim
without the establishment of a hierarchy of claims and without
reaching final conclusions of law or requiring a tribunal to address
the merits of a claim. The claims asserted by a particular claimant are
tallied and the total provides the appropriate percentage of revenues
due to each claimant. The claims are based on theories of sovereignty
the claimants have hitherto asserted for ownership of the Spratly Is-
lands within contemporary international law, the Island of Palmas
case, the Eastern Greenland case, the Clipperton case, and the Law of
the Sea.
The Island of Palmas case, a 1928 Permanent Court of Arbitration
decision, involved a dispute between the United States and the Neth-
233. See Park, supra note 127, at 52-53 (contending that the sovereignty issue is
between China and Vietnam, while the resource issue is between Vietnam and all
the other coastal states).




erlands over certain islands. 23 The United States claimed discovery
rights,236 while the Netherlands claimed "continuous and peaceful
display of authority.""27 The Court held that mere discovery of an is-
land is insufficient and that discovery must accompany a continuous
and peaceful display of authority or occupation.3' The Clipperton
Case, decided in 1931 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in-
volved a dispute between Mexico and France over sovereignty of
uninhabited islands.239 The Court held that when uninhabited islands
are involved, occupation is based on reasonableness and that actual
occupation may be unnecessary.2"° In 1933, the Court decided the
Eastern Greenland case, which involved a dispute between Norway
and Denmark over Greenland.24' Norway claimed that no one owned
Greenland, while Denmark claimed it exercised control over Green-
land for centuries. The Court held in favor of Denmark because its
claim to Greenland was uncontested until the early part of the twen-
tieth century. 1
2
A fusion of the Island of Palmas, Clipperton, and Eastern Green-
land cases is ineffective to solve the Spratly Island dispute on the
merits. First, the claimants are reluctant to place the dispute before
an international tribunal that would interpret and apply the case
precedent. Second, those cases lack clarity sufficient to decide the
Spratly Islands case on the merits. For example, the concept of title
by occupation, which China relies upon, is indecipherable with refer-
235. See The Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), reprinted
in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (1928) (stating the claims of the United States and the
Netherlands over the island of Las Palmas).
236. See id. (finding that the United States' claim of discovery was insufficient
as a basis of territorial sovereignty).
237. Id.
238. See id. at 911 (holding that there were not sufficient grounds to support the
United States' claim of sovereignty based on discovery).
239. See Fr. v. Mex., 6 Revue Generale du Droit International Public 3d 129,
129-32 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1932), reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932) (stating
that the claims of Mexico and France regarding sovereignty over Clipperton Is-
land).
240. See id. at 393-94.
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ence to a definition of the degree and kind of possession effective to
establish title and define the area of territory possessed.24' The points
system would avoid a decision on the merits of the claimants' posi-
tions and merely grant a point based on the claim itself. This broad
application of the legal concepts is more effective than grappling
with the issue of sovereignty and related concepts as they relate to a
particular claimant, and then deciding whether that particular claim-
ant fulfilled the legal requirements. Points are accumulated on the
criteria of historical title, treaty transfer, conquest, occupation, pre-
scription, the use of force, the use of force in self-defense, degree of
control, and the adjacency of the claimant's coastline and coastal
24zones.
Brunei's claim of right to the Spratly Islands involves two reefs:
Louisa Reef and Rifleman Reef.245 The basis of Brunei's claim is
"based on a 350-nautical-mile continental shelf claim or possibly on
its claim to Louisa Reef, 24 6 earning Brunei one point in the point
system.
China's claim to the entire Spratly Islands is based on historical
usage of the Spratly Islands because it occupied the Islands and exer-
cised control over them.4 China also asserts a right to the waters and
resources of the South China Sea based on the premise that islands,
islets, and reefs are in adjacent waters over which China has exer-
cised sovereignty.248 China's two points are added to claims asserted
by Taiwan. 49 Although such a position is seemingly unfair to Tai-
243. See R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 20 (1963) (defining occupation as "the appropriation by a State of a territory
which is not at the time subject to the sovereignty of any State").
244. See Jonathan I. Charney, Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the
Law of the Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 724, 728 (1995) (discussing these factors in the
context of general issues in the maritime boundaries).
245. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 228, at 38 (listing Brunei's claims to the
Spratly Islands, which include the maritime are surrounding the two reefs).
246. Id.
247. See id. at 20-22 (discussing China's connection with the Spratly Islands,
beginning as early as two thousand years ago).
248. See id. at 24 (noting that China claimed sovereignty over the seas around
the Spratly Islands in 1992).
249. See id. at 29-30 (noting Taiwan's claims of sovereignty, based on historical
association with China and occupation of certain islets).
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wan, it acknowledges four major points. First, the Peoples' Republic
of China ("Beijing") and the Republic of China ("Taiwan") will unite
in the new millennium because both believe there is only one China
and that the separation is only temporary.2' Second, any joint devel-
opment program which separates Beijing and Taiwan's claims to the
Spratly Islands would become convoluted, discombobulated and
generate a dysfunctional joint development formula.2" Third, any
other arrangement is unacceptable to China. Beijing, China's posi-
tion in the dispute will be determinative due to China's growing
economy and military strength. Fourth, China and Taiwan both agree
that there is a need for a united front to gain both strategic control
and petroleum rights associated with the South China Sea.252 Tai-
wan's claim to the Spratly Islands is based on historical us-
age/occupancy. 23 China and Taiwan's theories for ownership of the
Spratly Islands total three, thereby earning China/Taiwan three
points.
Malaysia's claim to the Spratly Islands is based on two theories:
first, continental shelf extension,-" and, second, the discovery and
occupation of six islands.-" Malaysia, therefore, has two points. The
Philippines' claim most of the Spratly islets based on adjacency, and
250. See Hong-jun Zhou, The Legal Order on Both Sides o the Taiwan Strait
and the Current Sino-Vietnain Relation, 87 AM. SOC. INTl L. PROC. 61 (1993)
(describing efforts between China and Taiwan to "relax tensions" in order to fur-
ther the goal of "One China").
251. Joint development is a complex issue due to the China-Taiwan issue and
the absence of a specific formula. See CHI-KIN LO, CHINA'S POLICY TOWARDS
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES: THE CASE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISL.ANDS 181 (1989).
252. See MARK J. VALENCIA, A MARITIME REGIME FOR NORTH-EAST ASIA 90
(1996) (discussing joint efforts of China and Taiwan regarding South China Sea
issues, despite increasing tensions in their relationship).
253. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 228, at 29 (discussing Taiwan's Policy
Guidelines for the South China Sea and Taiwan's occupation of the Ban Than Reef
in 1995). According to Taiwan's Policy Guidelines for the South China Sea, the
South China Sea is "'within the historic water limit" and is under Taiwan's juris-
diction. See id.
254. See id. at 36 (explaining that Malaysia's continental shelf argument arises
from international treaties and local legislation).
255. See id. (listing Ardaiser Reef, Dallas Reef, Louisa Reef, Mariveles Reef,
and Swallow Reef as the island Malaysia claims to "'occupy").
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discovery and prescriptive acquisition,256 providing the Philippines
with two points. Finally, Vietnam's claim to the Spratly Islands is
based on historical visits/possession "from time immemorial." 2" In
the alternative, Vietnam asserts succession to France's rights. ' Viet-
nam's second basis to the Spratly Islands is based on its continental
shelf. 2 9 Vietnam's total points are two. The point allocations total as
follows: Brunei, one point; China, three points; Malaysia, two points;
the Philippines, two points; and, Vietnam, two points. The total
points are ten. On a 100-point scale each claimant would receive
revenues from the Spratly Islands based on their total points without
evaluating the merits of their claim. The claimants would, therefore,
receive the following percentage of revenues from oil and fishing in
the Spratly Islands: Brunei, ten percent; China, thirty percent; Ma-
laysia, twenty percent; the Philippines, twenty percent; and Vietnam,
twenty percent.
The above point system allocations are sensitive to the unique
characteristics of the Spratly Islands dispute, which involves five
claimants with a mutual aversion towards the litigation process. The
points system also "recognizes" each claimant's position without a
hierarchy and provides revenues irrespective of the legal merits of a
particular claim of right to the Spratly Islands. Furthermore, the point
system avoids the complex issue of how to physically partition the
Spratly Islands area. It avoids possible future problems that could
arise if one country were given islands that later proved more valu-
able than another claimant's islands because of greater oil exploita-
tion revenues.
C. CRITICISM OF THE POINT SYSTEM
One major concern about the point system arises from the classical
Austin paradigm that presents the issues of who would serve as sov-
256. See id. at 33-35 (listing the Philippines' claim to the Spratly Islands and
adding that the Philippines' claim for economic need is implicit in the dispute itself
and applicable to each claimant).
257. Id. at 30.
258. See VALENCIA TE AL., supra note 228, at 30 (discussing Vietnam's in-
volvement with the Spratly Islands under French rule).
259. See id. at 31-32 (noting Vietnam's claim to a continental shelf, which ex-
tends 200 nautical miles from its coast).
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ereign and enforcer of the point system. This Article suggests that
enforcement would be through a collectively formed regional organi-
zation. The states would vest the organization with specific powers
as defined by the member states; including Brunei, China/Taiwan,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The countries would form a
social contract wherein the collective would agree to disagree within
the rules established by the regional organization. The Association of
South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), or any other existing or
newly established organization could monitor the rights, duties, and
privileges associated with the point system. This would comport with
ASEAN's objective to "accelerate the economic growth, social prog-
ress, and cultural development" and to "promote collaboration and
mutual assistance on matters of common interest of Southeast Asian
members.,, 260 A non-tribunal, yet regional type organization is more
effective for the Spratly Islands dispute because the regional organi-
zation would fail to threaten regional autonomy. A regional organi-
zation is also in line with the current trend in various parts of the
world and is the anticipated method of dispute resolution in the fu-
261ture due to economic exigencies.
The sovereignty issue or ruling body concern is lineally related to
concerns about who would provide protective/enforcement measures,
such as environmental controls, under the point system. This critique
suggests that the point system would generate economic waste and
environmental degradation because the Spratly Islands would remain
unowned. The view is that the Spratly Islands would suffer from
260. See Yoshi Kodama, Asia-Pacific Region: APEC And ASEAN, 30 INT'L
LAw. 367, 383 (1995) (quoting ASEAN's main goals, as set out in the Bangkok
Declaration); see also Deborah A. Hass, Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves
Toward Greater Regional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFT1, 9 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 809, 809 (1994) (citing the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
as a means to achieve ASEAN's goal).
261. See Louis F. Del Duca, Teachings of the European Comninit " Erperience
for Developing Regional Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485, 551 (1993) (ar-
guing that regional cooperation has grown in various parts of the world and is the
expected method of dispute resolution in the future due to "economic exigencies").
But see Gerald A. Malia, The New "International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea ": Prospects for Dispute Resolution at the "Sea Court ", 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 791, 792, 794 (1995) (discussing the provisions in the Convention on the
Law of the Sea for an "International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea").
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what Hardin theorized as the "Tragedy of the Commons. 26' Hardin
posited that collective property arrangements encourage abuse and
inefficiency.263 He asserted that if something is unowned, a sense of
responsibility is lacking and the property suffers degradation, dete-
rioration, and negative exploitation.26 Private ownership, according
to Hardin, is a better arrangement for the Spratly Islands and the sur-
rounding territories.
Hardin's view regarding the value of owning property has solid
scholarly antecedents. Notable scholars have addressed the topic of
individual property rights. Coase theorized that private ownership
spurs private incentives, which, in turn, produce quality controls.26 '
Coase used the example of a lighthouse to enunciate his position that
even a lighthouse, which is a public good, is produced and main-
tained at a higher quality when privately owned as opposed to pub-
licly owned. 66 John Locke also placed tremendous emphasis on pri-
vate ownership. Locke considered property rights tantamount to the
rights of life and liberty.2 6 The only role for government, as it relates
to property, is to protect against infringements and punish those who
infringe.2 69 Others made arguments similar to Locke. Frank Michel-
man asserted that when one's labor is involved, the resulting benefits
262. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244
(1968) (criticizing common property ownership in the context of population
growth).
263. See id. (listing the problems associated with common property ownership).
264. See id. (arguing that natural resources, such as shared ocean territories, are
wasted due to common use).
265. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 375-
76 (1974) (criticizing the "lighthouse" example used by scholars to demonstrate
the need for governmental economic functions).
266. See id. at 375 (demonstrating that private ownership of lighthouses in Brit-
ain proved to be successful with little government involvement).
267. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14-27 (3d ed.
1966) (explaining how the property given to mankind in common by God ulti-
mately becomes individually owned).
268. See id. at 5 (postulating that the law of nature teaches mankind not to harm
each other in life, liberty, health, or property).
269. See id. at 43-44 (asserting that political societies can only exist if they have
the power to preserve their member's property).
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should belong to that particular individual.> Adam Smith, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, and Henry Sidgwick each declared that property
related to labor is sacred and inviolable.:" Jeremy Bentham did not
accept Locke's notion of natural property rights. : 2 Instead, he ar-
gued, based on utilitarian grounds, that property rights serve the best
273interests of society. Property rights, according to Bentham, give a
sense of pleasure in ownership and an inducement for productivity.r"
A point system for the Spratly Islands would avoid Hardin's trag-
edy of the commons because each claimant would be an owner or
stakeholder..2 75 Broadly speaking, there are three forms of ownership
of property: communal, private, and governmental. : ' The stakeholder
status would entail a percentage system to distribute the economic
wealth of the Spratly Islands. The "private communal" system, em-
bodied by Brunei, China/Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Vietnam, would receive the oil and fishing profits of the Spratly Is-
lands. This Article proposes that the points system is a form of com-
munal ownership wherein each nation "owns," yet does not own, the
270. See Frank I. Michelman, Propert); Utiliy, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1204
(1967) (refusing to refute Locke's "labor theory").
271. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF TIlE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 256-89 (1966) (explaining the evolution of wealth from la-
bor and warning that it is dangerous to disturb that natural process). see also
Bleistein v. Donaldson, Lithographing, 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (espousing the
importance of an individual's work in the context of copyright), HENRY SIDGWICK,
THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 83 (2d ed. 1887).
272. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69 (1975) (arguing
that property is the direct result of the law).
273. See id. at 69-70 (explaining how the laws of property create riches and spur
productivity).
274. See id. at 70 (arguing that property rights have "vanquished the natural
aversion to labour").
275. See Williams J. Carney, Froin Stakeholders to Stockholders: A lieu from
Organizational Theomy, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT 187 (Peter J. Hill &
Roger E. Miners eds., 1998) (criticizing government control of public lands). Car-
ney argues for a system of privatization, rather than government ownership, based
on the premise that corporate interest would protect "public lands" better than the
government which has proven counterproductive and poorly managed. See id.
276. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theor " of Property Rights, reprinted in
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 86, 90 (Avery Weiner Katz
ed., 1998) (distinguishing idealized forms of ownership).
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South China Sea. The "disputed" area would belong to all the coun-
tries involved as common property, and in the spirit of John Adams,
the ocean and its treasures would become common property.2"
CONCLUSION
The Spratly Island dispute is a complex issue, involving numerous
claimants with complex concerns and legal issues. The problem is
resolvable with the adoption of B.A. Hamzah's confidence building
measures along with a point system that provides each country with a
share of the revenues from the Spratly Islands based on a tally of
their respective claims. This system provides an equitable distribu-
tion scheme without grappling with the unresolvable and inadequate
issues in existing international law. The point system further respects
the rights of the various claimants and provides an alternative that
may appeal to China.
277. See John Alton Duff, UNCLOS and the New Deep Seabed Mining Regime:
The Risks of Refuting the Treaty, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 6 n. 14
(1995) (citing Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, who quoted President John Ad-
ams, during a 1994 United Nations address).
[15:527
